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Abstract 
Computer network traffic, specifically from Windows-based computers, can be 
used to identify a host’s operating system and services.  Operating system identification 
dramatically increases the effectiveness a computer attack.  A host’s operating system 
can be determined by viewing protocol headers and payloads.  To effectively obfuscate 
the operating system, an obfuscation program must hide the operating system from 
multiple techniques.   Current obfuscation programs have two limitations:  the number of 
protocols obfuscated and the operating system the program can obfuscate.  Most current 
programs obfuscate only the Linux operating system.  These programs only obfuscate the 
TCP, UDP, and IP protocols and do not provide a complete obfuscation approach.   
The Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) program obfuscates all 
protocol OSI layers for the Windows operating system.  Nmap and Nessus test the 
obfuscation effectiveness of SNOS.  Four separate hosts are used to test SNOS – 
Exchange server, SharePoint server, web server and workstation.  SNOS’ obfuscation 
effectiveness is compared to a benchmark and another Windows obfuscation program – 
OSfuscate.   A network latency experiment determines the additional network latency 
induced by SNOS.  SNOS increased network latency for two of the four hosts.   
The Systemic Network Obfuscation Program successfully obfuscated the 
Windows operating systems against the techniques utilized by Nmap and Nessus and 
provides an effective obfuscation process throughout all the protocol layers of a network 
packet.  
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Systemic Network Obfuscation System 
 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation 
 Network packets can reveal the operating system and running services of a host.  
Ron Gula – the CEO of Nessus, a well-known vulnerability and exploitation analysis 
program, stated, “The ability to accurately classify an OS [operating system] is vital for 
automatic asset discovery and classification” [Gul09].  Without the ability to accurately 
identify the host operating system, an attacker would not be able to accurately craft a 
custom-tailored exploit because exploits depend upon the operating system of the target 
host.   
 The desire to hide the operating system from a possible attacker directed this 
research to explore the possibilities of obfuscating network packets.  Previous research 
and programs focused on Linux-based operating systems; limited research is devoted 
primarily for the Windows operating system family.  This research focuses on 
obfuscating the Windows operating systems, specifically Windows XP and Windows 
Server 2003, from known fingerprinting techniques.   
1.2 Goals 
 The Windows operating system can be obfuscated by modifying the packets 
directly on the host.  The goal of the Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) is to 
provide a complete set of obfuscation techniques for a Windows host to defeat 
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fingerprinting methods.  To accurately obfuscate the Windows operating system on a 
host, SNOS obfuscates a network packet at every layer of the TCP/IP and OSI models 
which is discussed further in Section 4.1.2.  SNOS defeats several fingerprinting 
techniques because fingerprinting programs – specifically Nmap and Nessus – utilize 
multiple methods to identify the host’s operating system.   In order to defeat these 
programs, the obfuscation method has to defeat each fingerprinting method. 
1.3 Assumptions 
Network packets are created and used by thousands of different protocols and 
services.  The goal of SNOS is to obfuscate all layers of the TCP/IP model for a network 
packet.  Application layer protocols represent a seemingly endless set of protocols and 
services that might need obfuscation; this research focuses on a subset of all available 
protocols and services.   
The protocols and services are selected based on studies identifying the most 
common protocols and services on a network and the protocols used during 
fingerprinting techniques.  The SNOS program only obfuscates protocols and services 
identified as a common protocol found on a network or a commonly used protocol for 
fingerprinting the host’s operating system.      
1.4 Previous Obfuscation Approach Limitations 
Previous research focused on network-based devices to obfuscate network packets 
or focused on obfuscating network packets from a Linux operating system [Ber03] 
[RoS01].  Traffic normalization and transport scrubbing, two similar approaches, attempt 
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to eliminate protocol variances between operating system implementations.  Although not 
specifically designed for operating system obfuscation, these two approaches can remove 
certain header fields that identify the Windows operating system.  A proxy server 
approach intercepts packets and crafts a new normalized packet and sends that to the 
correct destination and is similar to a transport scrubber.  These three similar methods 
were developed to work only on a Linux operating system.  To achieve obfuscation for 
hosts running a Windows operating system, these methods can obfuscate an entire 
network of packets, like a firewall, by intercepting all network traffic before the packets 
leave the network.   
None of these methods are capable of obfuscating all network traffic from a 
Windows operating system. These methods are implemented using network-based 
devices and therefore are designed to obfuscate network traffic leaving or arriving into 
the network.  These methods cannot obfuscate a host’s network packets transmitted 
within the network.  OSfuscate is the only Windows-based program that claims to 
obfuscate the Windows operating system by running directly on the Windows operating 
system.  OSfuscate focuses on a specific fingerprinting technique and does not provide a 
system wide obfuscation approach to defeat multiple fingerprinting techniques.   
Section 2.5 provides additional details about each of these related obfuscation 
techniques, the limitations of each and is sub-divided into network-based and host-based 
obfuscation approaches.  The Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) differs 
from these research topics by providing a Windows-based obfuscation program able to 
obfuscate all network packets from a Windows host.  SNOS obfuscates all the OSI layers 
of a network packet to provide complete obfuscation process. 
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1.5 Research Overview 
 This research identifies the fingerprinting techniques and how these techniques 
can be defeated without losing functionality.  The experimental process is divided into 
two separate experiments – obfuscation effectiveness which measures the success of 
SNOS in defeating fingerprinting techniques and network latency which compares the 
network performance degradation caused while running SNOS.  For each experiment a 
benchmark trial is run to provide a base to compare against.  For the obfuscation 
effectiveness experiment, OSfuscate runs as a third trial to test the effectiveness of SNOS 
relative to the results of OSfuscate against the fingerprinting programs.  Chapter 3 further 
identifies the experimental design and Chapter 4 identifies the details and selection 
process of the SNOS program.  Nmap and Nessus are used to test the obfuscation 
effectiveness of each trial.  These two programs are selected because each uses multiple 
fingerprinting techniques.    
The experiments are run within a virtual environment using the VMware ESXi 
hypervisor.  Virtualization allows for repetition of each experiment while limiting the 
variable differences between each trial.  The only variable difference between each trial is 
whether or not an obfuscation program is running on the host with three possible choices 
– no obfuscation (benchmark), OSfuscate, and SNOS.   
 Chapter 5 provides an observational and interpretive analysis of the results from 
both experiments.  The obfuscation effectiveness results show a clear difference between 
SNOS and the other two trials – benchmark and OSfuscate.    
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II. Background 
 The following sections give an overview of how and why information must be 
protected, an overview of fingerprinting, the role of fingerprinting in network attacks, 
tools used for fingerprinting, and current tools and techniques available to minimize the 
effectiveness of fingerprinting.   
2.1 Protecting Information 
“Provided the enemy … is capable of reacting to what he sees, or thinks he sees, 
he can apparently be taken in again and again” [Bar52]. 
The primary role of most system/network administrators, technicians, or 
engineers is to protect information.  Traditionally, important financial or other sensitive 
corporate or government information has been the focus of information protection.   
Computers and networks configured to protect sensitive information divulge information 
about themselves.  Information pertaining to the end device can be used by someone with 
malicious intent to perform malicious activity and allow an attacker to gain control over 
that device, which ultimately leads to the compromise of information. 
Important host information is easily accessible from host devices.  Similar to a 
chatty employee around the water cooler, an attacker need only listen in on the 
conversation between employees or simply initiate the conversation with an unsuspecting 
employee [Kol05].  Modern operating systems and services either willfully or indirectly 
identify themselves in how they reply to various network traffic requests.   
 “A quick packet capture, on any network will show you that machines are chatty 
and will provide someone ‘new’ (a computer they know nothing about) info about their 
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OS, name, IP, MAC, locally logged on user, etc.  Each OS has its own chatty nature and 
protocols it uses, some have been cleaned up, a bit, over the years, others don’t appear to 
have been at all, and yet other protocols are being added that are designed to make life 
easier, but have added even more noise to the line” [Kol05]. 
Protecting sensitive host information, like the operating system, is often 
disparagingly referred to as ‘security by obscurity’.  Protecting information through 
obfuscation, masking or hiding sensitive information, is a well utilized approach.  The 
simple act of leaving lights on in the house to appear that someone is home provides a 
simple example to the commonplace use and benefits attributed to the ‘security by 
obscurity’ defense mechanism [Yui06].  The military actively uses this approach by 
wearing camouflage [Mur09].   
Modern firewalls and proxy servers hide information – such as the actual Internet 
Protocol (IP) address of an end device by using dynamic Network Address Translation 
(NAT) – at the network level.  These techniques are an important step to protecting 
information by hiding sensitive information from an attacker.  Despite the use of NAT 
and Access Control Lists (ACL), neither firewalls nor proxy servers currently protect the 
chatty sensitive information that most devices readily provide.  The importance of 
obfuscating this sensitive host information has typically been downplayed and often 
ignored.  Though obfuscation does exist within the information technology realm, 
typically obfuscation only plays an implicit role instead of an explicit one [Yui06].  
Obfuscation and deception consists of determining the information someone should and 
should not know, control the focus, and prevent any undesired information from being 
observed [Rep08].   
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Host-based obfuscation increases adversary uncertainty and can increase the time 
and effort required to gain insight into possible attack vectors of the host.  Many methods 
to obfuscate and conceal various aspects of the host device’s identification have been 
studied and researched including normalizers, format alternation, scrambling identifiers, 
reordering content, and dynamic infrastructures [Rep08] and are discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.2 Scanning / Planning 
Some networking professionals estimate that an adversary spends up to 95% of 
their time preparing for an attack while only spending around 5% actually executing the 
attack [KFL01].  The preparation time is referred to as the planning phase in this 
research.  An adversary is vulnerable during the planning phase because an attacker is, in 
some form, generating traffic on the network.  During the planning phase, an attacker is 
attempting to glean as much information as possible from the network infrastructure.   
Obtaining host device information is commonly referred to as fingerprinting.  
Several applications exist that allow someone to easily scan a network and determine the 
host operating systems and services running on each host system.  Fingerprinting itself is 
not the immediate threat; fingerprinting is instead a precursor to an attack [WSM04].  
Fingerprinting provides an attacker with sensitive information needed to specially craft 
exploits against the target host [Ark01].  Particularly, determining the host operating 
system is necessary for an attacker to correctly carry out a targeted exploit by identifying 
entry points, payloads, and existing vulnerabilities of the host operating system [Ber03] 
[Mur09].  Furthermore, knowing the host operating system could even allow an attacker 
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to set up a simulated environment similar to the target to find additional vulnerabilities 
[SkL08].   
Figure 1 shows a Wireshark capture between two hosts located on the same local 
network.  The figure shows two separate Browser packets – a Windows-generated packet 
on the right and a Linux-generated packet on the left.   
 
Figure 1: Browser Protocol Wireshark Capture [Kol05] 
The packets in Figure 1 indicate the OS Major and OS Minor Version.  Although 
the number after these fields might not appear to be valuable, an attacker can simply look 
up the corresponding operating system in a database full of predefined header field 
patterns.  “OS Major Version: 5” represents Windows and “OS Minor Version: 1” means 
that the version of Windows is XP.  By quickly examining this one packet, an attacker 
now knows that the host computer is running Windows XP.  The packet on the right of 
Figure 1 gives additional information located in the Host Comment field identifying the 
application and exact version number responsible for the service. 
During this phase an attacker typically scans sections of a network to determine 
each host’s operating system and the services running on each host.  Several application-
level protocols, like HTTP and SMTP, as well as TCP and IP header fields, are used to 
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identify the specifics of a host’s operating system and services.  The differences between 
the results are often easily discernable and are detailed in Section 2.3. 
2.2.1 The Deception Process 
Obfuscation is a type of deception.  The deception process must produce results 
that continue to deceive irrespective of the attack method.  To deceive an attacker, not 
only must false information be presented but any other valid information must remain 
hidden [Yui06].  This false information includes crafting packets to appear to have been 
created from different operating systems and applications. 
To date, current attempts to obfuscate host-level information have only narrowly 
focused on certain aspects of host-level detection.  None of the researched and well-
known host-level obfuscation tools discussed in Section 2.5.2 provide a thorough defense 
against the many fingerprinting methods.  A solid deception framework must be able to 
conceal information at multiple levels and from different fingerprinting methods.   
Figure 2 depicts a decision flowchart necessary for determining the varying facets 
an attacker can use to obtain the important host information.  A fingerprinting method is 
deployed against a host.  After the host had been engaged and the results returned, the 
attacker can make a decision to attempt a new fingerprinting method against the host or 
terminate the fingerprinting process.  If an attacker is deceived during the first attempt, 
the attacker would deploy additional fingerprinting methods.  Nmap and Nessus use this 
multi-technique approach to fingerprinting a host; therefore, a deception should be 
verifiable against multiple fingerprinting methods [Yui06]. 
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Figure 2: The Basic Deception Process [adapted from Yui06] 
If the current obfuscation process only changes certain transmission control 
protocol (TCP) header values but the computer still advertises an Internet Information 
Service (IIS) service, then the TCP header obfuscation becomes meaningless.  The IIS 
service implies that the host is running a Windows operating [Bec01]. 
2.3 Planning / Scanning Vectors 
The three main sources an attacker can scan from are: external, malware, and 
insiders [Yui06].  Firewall solutions can stop external scanning against hosts behind the 
firewall.  Firewall rule sets can include blocking unsolicited TCP sessions (initiations) 
and ICMP requests.  Firewalls can be averted by performing different types of scans or 
implementing the scan differently.  One possible way to bypass a firewall or IDS 
(intrusion detection system) is to simply change the maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
size or fragment the correlating packets in an attempt to exploit the differences between 
how a firewall de-fragments and fragments packets. 
Malware located on an internal host is already inside the “trusted” local network, 
and has fewer security features to overcome in order to start scanning and identifying 
other local hosts.  Computers located inside the “trusted” local network can become 
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infected through several different scenarios, ranging from social engineering attacks to 
man-in-the-middle attacks.  Social engineering attacks are now fairly simple to 
orchestrate thanks to the wide range of script kiddie tools, so called because of their ease 
of use.   
Once malware gains access on a computer, the malware can start locating other 
possible targets within the local network infrastructure.  The Sapphire worm is a scan-
and-attack example, once the computer is infected, the worm sends out UDP packets 
throughout the local network and beyond [Naz04].   
An insider could be someone that is willingly, or just unknowingly, helping an 
attacker.  The attacker could be the insider.  Similar to the malware approach above, an 
insider has already bypassed network-based security features – such as the firewall or 
IDS and has more access to obtain host-level information from the remaining local hosts.   
Mazu Networks, determined that 23% of organizations in the United States with 
more than 1,000 employees had at least one internal security breach during 2004 with 
another 27% not sure if a compromise was internal or external [Yua05].  The survey 
shows the fundamental problem of simply relying on a network-based firewall or IDS in 
an effort to protect host-level information. 
2.3.1 Fingerprinting Techniques 
Host-level information can also be extracted from network traffic by sifting 
through network packet headers and pattern similarities.  Similar to how law enforcement 
utilizes fingerprints, computer fingerprinting techniques obtain a set of patterns by 
scanning a host and viewing the network traffic from that host.  The computer fingerprint 
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is compared with a list, or database, of various network traffic patterns.  Software 
vendors, including the operating system developers, implement network protocols 
differently.   
The different implementations of a protocol stack are allowed because protocol 
specifications leave ambiguities while implementing optional fields and the order and 
value of specific header fields.  The ambiguities within protocol specifications allow an 
attacker to view the characteristics of how the target host implements a specific protocol 
and matches the results with the known characteristics of a specific operating system or 
service.  Protocol ambiguities allow for more sophisticated scanning [WSM04]. 
Two general probing techniques are commonly deployed to determine host 
information: active and passive fingerprint probing.  Active probing involves sending a 
custom crafted packet to the target host and listening for the reply.  Therefore, active 
probing requires both the target host and the attacker to participate.  These specially 
crafted packets include three common IP packet types (ICMP, TCP, and UDP) and are 
crafted to use both standard and non-standard protocol implementations [KaS10].  Active 
probing, if coming from an external source, can be blocked by a firewall or IDS 
[BHP07].  The attacker uses the reply packet as the fingerprint of the target host.  Active 
probing/scanning gives an attacker a more complete view of the host and services 
running on the host.  Active probing can usually produce information about a host much 
faster than passive probing. 
Passive probing is deployed by observing the normal network traffic already 
generated by the target host and is stealthier because it does not generate network traffic.  
Passive probing only sees traffic destined to itself or traffic sent as a broadcast or 
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multicast message unless the attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack or the 
network uses a hub or spanning port on a switch.  Passive probing does not produce as 
much host information because the network enabled services on a host wait for a request 
before transmitting response packets.  If a host does not get a request on a specific service 
port number during the time an attacker is passively probing, then the attacker will never 
see any traffic regarding that running service.  Passive probing increases the time needed 
to scan a target for host-level information. 
A lesser-utilized fingerprinting approach is aptly named exploit testing.  This 
approach initiates a series of network traffic at a target with the attempt to create a denial-
of-service attack specific to an operating system.  If the target host crashes accordingly, 
then the attacker can potentially determine the host operating system given the specially 
crafted denial of service attack performed [Bec01].  This method of fingerprinting is both 
very noisy and provides a more limited set of host-level information than the two 
previously mentioned methods.  In general, exploit testing is not commonly used to 
fingerprint a host, unless the primary goal of an attack is to simply crash the target host. 
2.3.1.1  Fingerprinting Specifics Overview 
Irrespective of the fingerprinting technique used, fingerprinting is more effective 
if the target host has multiple services running with significant amounts of information 
transmitted over the network that can be used to narrow down the fingerprint of the 
operating system and services [Fyo02].   
Passive and active fingerprinting techniques inspect the implementation details of 
the target’s protocol stack, including the application, TCP, and IP layers.  Common 
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header fields like the time-to-live (TTL), window size, Don’t Fragment bit (DF), type of 
service (TOS), IP ID sequence number and TCP sequence numbers provide information 
in determining the host’s operating system [Mur09] [Fyo02].  Figure 3 shows some of the 
default TTL values according to the specific operating and how these values infer the 
host’s operating system.  The default TTL values are shown on the right for each 
operating system; Windows XP’s default TTL value is 128.  An attacker can view the 
TTL header field from an IP packet and identify the target’s operating system.   
 
Figure 3: Default OS-specific TTL values [Kol05] 
 
2.3.2 Banner Grabbing 
Another method of fingerprinting, which was a technique used by early hackers, 
is referred to as banner grabbing [Ber03].  The banner refers to the general message the 
host application displays to a user accessing that service.  The banner is a string of text 
with a general announcement that typically includes specifics on host services [SiB07].  
These banner messages are common and still widely used today in applications such as 
FTP, telnet, SSH, SMB, and SMTP.  Sometimes the banner specifically displays the 
operating system, the application version, and patch level.  Other times, the banner 
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displays a correlated number referencing the operating system or application name and/or 
version number.   
Even though banner grabbing is a well known means for obtaining sensitive host 
information, application developers and appliance vendors still display sensitive host 
information in the default banners.  Even security related appliances and services 
sometimes provide this information.  Figure 4 and Figure 5 are live banners currently 
viewable to anyone connecting to either of these hosts on the Internet. 
 
Figure 4: Email Filter Banner 
Figure 4 shows a security device, in this case an email filtering appliance that 
displays both the application and the current installed and running version of the 
application.   
 
Figure 5: Microsoft Exchange Banner 
Figure 5 provides shows a banner displaying Microsoft ESMTP which implies 
that the email server is a Microsoft Exchange server.  Version 6.0 means the Exchange 
server is running Exchange Server 2003; because the server is running Exchange, the host 
operating system is a version of Windows server, most likely Windows Server 2003 
[GLM10].  Banner grabbing not only references the default messages services transmit 
over the network, but also certain application-layer protocol-related header fields, such as 
the Server field in a HTTP header.  Several of these fields are reviewed in more detail in 
the subsequent sections.  A thorough obfuscation method must address banner grabbing.  
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Obfuscating the entire TCP/IP stack successfully is meaningless if an attacker can view 
the banner message from the server application and then glean all the information the 
TCP/IP stack obfuscation processes protects [Bec03].   
2.3.3 TCP / IP Stack Fingerprinting 
The IP header, Figure 6, contains some of the most common fields used to 
identify a host operating system.  The 3-bit Flags field in the IP header consists of the 
Reserved bit (1st bit), the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit (2nd bit), and the More Fragments bit 
(3rd bit).  Each one of these three bits can be used to identify the host, particularly the DF 
bit, because operating systems utilize and respond differently depending on which bits 
are set.   
 
Figure 6:  IP Packet [Ark01] 
 
The first stack querying/fingerprinting methods targeted the IP and TCP protocols 
[Spa03].  TCP fingerprinting sends both standard and malformed TCP packets to the 
target host and then analyzes the responses [VCH02].  New service packs for an 
operating system sometimes implements the TCP and IP protocols with slight variations.  
Several fingerprinting programs, such as Nmap and Nessus, use TCP querying to 
 
determine the host operating system
from Figure 3 demonstrates how some of the information from the host’s response can be 
used to fingerprint the host’s 
The TCP header field variations, in
can imply the underlying operating system.  The window size field and the sequence of 
any options within the Options field a
of the TCP header consists of the Congestion Window Reduced (CWR) bit, the ECN
Echo (ECE) bit, the Urgent (URG) bit, the Acknowledgement (ACK) bit, the Push (PSH) 
bit, the Synchronize (SYN) bit, and the F
packet to synchronize the sequence numbers and the ACK bit is set when replying to all 
the packets initiated from SYN bit packet.  These flag bits are used for operating system 
fingerprinting by setting seldom used or seldom grouped together bit fields to see how the 
target operating system responds.
One of the first steps to query 
bit to detect open ports and services
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 (OS) and services on the target.  The TTL example 
OS and services.   
 Figure 7, between different operating systems 
re useful in TCP fingerprinting.  The flags portion 
inish (FIN) bit.  The SYN bit is used by the first 
 
 
Figure 7: TCP Packet 
a host’s operating system is to set the synchronize 
.  Operating systems utilize different ports
-
.  Windows 
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operating systems typically have port 139 open which is the NetBIOS session or 
Windows File and Printer Sharing default port.  Some firewalls and IDSs are able to 
block these requests by not allowing an external device to initiate a connection with the 
target device.  But certain applications, like a web or email server, have to allow initial 
TCP requests in from external sources and therefore the SYN technique can still target 
these hosts.  Any SYN packet sent from within the LAN would also be successful as the 
scan is already beyond the reach of a network firewall.  A thorough obfuscation program 
must also block unused ports that are opened by default to limit the amount of data 
correlation available from the scanned results of a host. 
Another simple TCP fingerprinting method is to send a packet with the ACK bit 
set and observe the response from the host.  Some operating systems drop the packet 
while other operating systems send back a TCP packet with the RST flag set.  The ACK 
technique can bypass firewall rule sets, but a stateful firewall – a firewall that remembers 
TCP session states – should drop this packet.  A network firewall is useful against 
external attack vectors but provides limited obfuscation benefits for internal network 
traffic.  A similar approach is to send a TCP packet with the RST bit set and wait for the 
response back from the host.  The RST method has similar advantages and disadvantages 
as the ACK method.   
Another well utilized method of stack querying is the Initial Sequence Number 
(ISN) analysis.  An operating system initials a random ISN to deter session hijacking; 
however, the range of the possible ISNs can be used to imply which operating system the 
host is currently running.  Another fingerprinting method referred to as temporal response 
analysis observes the retransmission timeout (RTO) responses from a host to imply 
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operating system specifics [Spa03].  A more in-depth view of the different approaches to 
TCP stack querying and current tools used to conduct TCP stack querying is detailed in 
Section 2.4.   
TCP fingerprinting can be done passively and actively.  With active TCP 
fingerprinting the attacker sends malformed packets to view responses from the target.  
To more accurately identify a host, an attacker uses several TCP fingerprinting methods 
at the same time, increasing the likeliness the results correlate with the same operating 
system.  TCP fingerprinting allows the attacker to gain a fairly comprehensive 
understanding about the configuration of the host by viewing the open ports and 
determining the services running on those ports.   
2.3.4 ICMP Fingerprinting 
Figure 8 shows how the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packet is 
constructed.  The possible values for the ICMP header fields provide the means for an 
attacker to gain insight into the operating system running on the host machine.  
Information is gleaned from the TOS, type of service, byte which consists of the 
Precedence Bits, TOS bits, and the Unused bit.  A standard ICMP packet will have the 
TOS field set to zero; attackers populate the TOS bit to help fingerprint the target by 
viewing how the target operating system responds.   
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Figure 8: ICMP Echo Request Message Format [Ark01] 
In Figure 8, the Type field in the ICMP header indicates the type of message 
being relayed.  Some the possible types include: destination network unreachable, 
destination host unreachable, fragmentation required, echo reply, echo request, timestamp 
reply, address mask request, etc.  The Type field allows for 255 different message types – 
although less than 50 are actively used.  The Code field relates to the Type field and 
provides additional supporting information. 
The ICMP identifier field has a constant value that can be used to identify the host 
operating system [Ark01].  Windows operating systems send packets with an Identifier of 
0x0200, 0x0300, or 0x0400 [Kol05].  Figure 9 is a list of the common ICMP Identifier 
field values and the associated operating system. 
21 
 
 
Figure 9: ICMP Identifier Field values [Kol05] 
 The ICMP Sequence number increments for each corresponding ICMP packet.  
For Windows operating systems, the sequence number increments by 0x0100 (256) for 
each proceeding ICMP packet and most Novel Netware operating systems keep the 
sequence number at 0x0000 for the duration of the current set of pings [Kol05]. 
For ICMP packets, the TTL value inside the IP header depends on if the ICMP 
message is a request or a response.  As previously discussed in regards to TCP/IP stack 
fingerprinting and shown in Figure 3, the TTL IP header field is similarly useful in 
inferring the host’s operating system for an ICMP message. 
The data field in Figure 8 is the payload of the ICMP packet.  Operating systems 
use different payloads which makes the fingerprinting process easier.  Linux operating 
systems use a timestamp followed by random bits ending with 1234567.  Windows 
operating systems use a 32 byte payload of repeating characters of the alphabet starting 
with ‘A’ [Kol05].  The size of the ICMP data field is also different between a Windows 
operating system and a Linux operating system [Ark01].   
TOS Echoing is a specially-crafted ICMP packet that changes the value in the 
TOS IP header field.  Another specially-crafted ICMP packet sets the ‘Unused bit’ in the 
IP header.  Setting the DF (Don’t Fragment) bit for an ICMP request produces varying 
responses from different operating systems.  When sending ICMP query messages with 
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the Code field set to any value other than zero, Windows operating systems echo back the 
Code value that the host received while Unix-based hosts will set the value to zero in the 
response.  Setting the ICMP Address Mask field is another technique to identify which 
version of Unix-based operating system the host is running [Ark01] because different 
versions of Unix-based operating systems populate this field uniquely.   
All of the ICMP methods require observing the responses received from the target 
host.  Using ICMP to fingerprinting a host, an attacker can determine if the host operating 
system generates ICMP Protocol Unreachable Error Messages, ICMP Error Messaging 
Quenching, ICMP Error Message Quoting Size, or ICMP Error Message Quoting Size 
Differences.  The last error message is particular only for Linux-based operating systems.  
Several other error-related messages identify the host machine, such as: ICMP Error 
Message Echoing Integrity, or observing the Precedence, TOS, or DF bits from ICMP 
Error messages [Ark01].   
The ICMP protocol allows for several types of ICMP messages.  The first 8 bits, 
as shown in Figure 8, of the ICMP header are used to distinguish the type of ICMP 
message being transmitted.  Operating systems do not implement every possible ICMP 
message type and therefore soliciting replies using different ICMP message types can 
also reveal the operating system running on the host.  Some of these additional, lesser 
known ICMP message types are: ICMP Time Stamp Request and Reply and ICMP 
Information Request and Reply [Ark01].   
The ICMP protocol receives a significant amount of attention at the network layer 
as network administrators often configure firewalls to block ICMP requests and replies 
from leaving the network.  Local area network (LAN) traffic often allows ICMP 
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messages between hosts.  Once an attacker has compromised a single host inside the 
LAN or if the attacker is an ‘insider’ then that attacker can carry out ICMP fingerprinting 
methods to identify additional targets on the local network.   
2.3.5 DHCP Fingerprinting 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is used to dynamically configure a 
host’s network settings to allow the host to use the network.  These settings include the IP 
address, Subnet Mask, the default Gateway, and Dynamic Name Service (DNS) servers, 
as well as other configuration settings.  
The DHCP process is shown in Figure 10.  The first step shown in Figure 10 is 
when a new host on the LAN sends out a broadcast DHCP Discovery message in an 
attempt to locate a DHCP server.  When the broadcast message reaches a DHCP server, 
the server replies back to the host with a DHCP Offer message.  When the host receives 
the DHCP Offer packet, the host then sends a DHCP Request packet back to the DHCP 
server.  The server responds by sending the host a DHCP ACK packet containing the 
LAN configuration settings.  Figure 10 shows some of the possible deviations from this 
normal flow of DHCP messages for different possible scenarios – DHCP configuration’s 
lease time has exceeded or another host already has the IP address assigned.   
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Figure 10: DHCP Flowchart [adapted from Kol07] 
A host operating system requests specific options from a DHCP server.  These 
options vary between operating systems.  Figure 11 identifies some of the options and the 
parameters of a DHCP packet.  The hostname is visible so organizations that use a 
service-oriented naming convention, i.e. calling a web server web1, allow an attacker to 
know open ports and services running on that host.  Sometimes organizations include the 
operating system type in the hostname of the device, such as web1win2003 which 
identifies that the host is running Windows Server 2003. 
Other important fields, shown in Figure 11, are the Differentiated Services Field, 
the Seconds elapsed field, and the Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) flags.  The BOOTP flags 
are a legacy of BOOTP which DHCP replaced.  These bits are typically all 0’s.  Some of 
these fields vary between operating systems.  Option 55 is one of the most useful fields 
for DHCP fingerprinting because it is the Parameter Request List which indicates the 
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order of the DHCP options are being requested by the host [Kol07] and operating systems 
order the options differently. 
 
Figure 11: DHCP Packet [Kol07] 
A complicated and less reliable DHCP fingerprinting method is to observe the 
various time delays the host takes before trying to send out another DHCP Discovery 
packet when a DHCP server is not initially found by the host [Kol07].  A host waits a 
pre-determined amount of time, depending upon the host’s operating system, before 
retransmitting a DHCP Discovery packet. 
Application fingerprinting observes the data transmitted from application layer 
protocols.  These application layer protocols include:  Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and 
Secure Shell (SSH).     
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2.3.6 HTTP Fingerprinting 
The HTTP protocol can be divided into request and response messages.  One of 
the header fields in a HTTP request message is the User-Agent field, shown in Figure 12 
– which shows a Wireshark capture of an HTTP request message.  The User-Agent field 
indicates the type and typically the version of the web browser that the host is running.  
The User-Agent field in Figure 12 indicates that the host’s web browser is Microsoft 
Internet Explorer version 8.0.  Also, inside the User-Agent field the text “.NET CLR 2.0” 
means that the host is running Microsoft .Net version 2.0 [Kol05] which can provide 
further avenues of attack.   
 
Figure 12:  HTTP Request Packet 
The User-Agent HTTP header field is often used by web developers to determine 
the Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML), JavaScript, and Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) 
implementations that are needed by the requesting host.  Web developers rely on this 
field in order to respond with the correct version of the web page that is best suited for a 
particular web browser’s implementation.  The variance in web browser functions, 
features, and how items are displayed – using HTML, JavaScript, and CSS – are a major 
nuance for web developers.  Web browsers add new variations to the web browser’s 
content markup and scripting while ignoring portions of the standards set forth.  Since 
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web browsers depend on portions of this information, the functionality of the web 
browser is tested with SNOS running.   
An attacker must either passively monitor all traffic from a host or perform some 
kind of DNS poisoning to the host’s DNS servers so that the host’s HTTP Request 
message would be sent to the attacker’s machine or use some form of social engineering.  
An HTTP Response message is the response to an HTTP Request.  HTTP Response 
packet fingerprinting can be performed by actively sending an HTTP Request message to 
the host and waiting for the response.   
Figure 13 illustrates a typical HTTP Response message back from a web server.  
In Figure 12 and 13, IP addresses, domain names, and other identifying information have 
been removed because these packets were captured from live servers on the Internet.   
 
Figure 13:  HTTP Response Packet 
 A useful field for fingerprinting the HTTP Response message is the Server field.  
The Server field displays the type of web server running – a Microsoft Internet 
Information Services (IIS) version 6.0.  Based on the type of web server, an attacker can 
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infer the operating system of the host [Fyo02].  Sometimes the Server field actually 
displays the operating system in parenthesis immediately after the type of web server 
version. The X-Powered-By field also indirectly indicates the type and version number of 
the web server and therefore the operating system.  
Similar to TCP fingerprinting, HTTP fingerprinting involves sending non-
standard HTTP Request packets to the web server, such as: sending a delete instead of a 
get, improperly identifying the HTTP version – e.g., HTTP/3.0, or a response with an 
improper protocol specified – e.g., Junk/1.0 [Sha04].  The order of the HTTP Response 
header fields vary depending upon the web server implementation, evidenced in Figure 
14 below which shows two HTTP Response messages from different web servers running 
on different operating systems.  These web servers, an Apache/1.3.23 and a Microsoft 
IIS/5.0, order the HTTP Response header fields differently.   The message field changes 
when non-standard HTTP packets are sent to a web server.  Some web servers ignore the 
non-standard parts and still serve up a valid HTTP Response while other web servers 
respond with an error message, e.g. HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request [Sha04].   
 
Figure 14: Web Server Dependant HTTP Response Messages [Sha04]  
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2.3.7 SMB Fingerprinting 
Server Message Block (SMB) fingerprinting is another avenue to obtain host 
information being transmitted in a network packet.  SMB is an application-layer protocol 
like HTTP, SMTP, and FTP and is primarily used to provide shared access to files and 
printers.   
 SMB uses several subcommand layers.  Figure 15 shows a Session Setup AndX 
Response subcommand packet which provides the most obvious OS identification fields.  
The Native OS and Native LAN Manager fields identify the operating system and the 
service and version using the SMB protocol. 
 
Figure 15:  SMB Protocol 
2.4 Current Fingerprinting Tools 
2.4.1 Nmap 
Nmap is one of the most respected and popular fingerprinting tools freely 
available on the Internet and runs on most operating systems.  Nmap has a large database 
backend to identify thousands of different host operating systems by comparing results 
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from various fingerprinting scans [Fyo02].  Nmap sends TCP, UDP, and ICMP scans to 
open and closed ports.  These scans exploit the ambiguities in the standard protocol RFCs 
[Fyo02].  Nmap listens for the response and compares those responses with the profiles 
stored in its database.   
 The Nmap program uses a wide range of TCP/IP stack fingerprinting methods.  
For sequence generation scans, Nmap sends TCP SYN packets to the same port on a host 
but varies the window size, timestamp, MSS field, and several others to solicit different 
responses to each scan in order to more accurately determine the specifications of the 
implemented TCP/IP stack.   A ‘TCP ping’ is a TCP packet with the ACK flag set with 
destination port of 80 [Wol02].  TCP pings can sometimes bypass stateful firewall rule 
sets [Wol02] and force a web server to decide how to handle a session acknowledgement 
when the server did not initiate the session.  Some operating systems drop the ACK 
response while others send back a RST message [Fyo02].   
Timing-related scans in Nmap can differentiate between TCP Tahoe or TCP Reno 
TCP/IP stacks [WSM04].  Almost all of the TCP options can be set and changed using 
Nmap as well as changing the port number to target with the specific TCP scan [Wol02].   
 ICMP scanning also plays an important role in Nmap OS detection.  An IE (ICMP 
Echo) test by Nmap sends two ICMP echo request packets to the target host.  The first 
ICMP message has the IP DF bit set, the TOS bit set to zero, a code of nine – which is 
normally set to zero, the sequence number as 295, and a random IP ID and payload 
[Fyo02].  Nmap also sends varying ICMP Requests messages such as the ICMP 
Timestamp Request message to help identify the operating system [Wol02].   
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 Figure 16 provides a quick list of some of fingerprinting techniques that Nmap 
uses to fingerprint a host, including the operating system and services.   
 
Figure 16: Common Nmap Fingerprinting Techniques[Kol05] 
Nmap uses a SYN scan to detect open ports on the target.  Nmap takes the list of 
now known open ports on the target and connects to them by using a protocol list referred 
to as a Service scan.  The protocol list allows Nmap to detect the running application 
which can disclose the underlying target’s operating system. 
Nmap produces two separate tests – the OS Class (direct operating system 
identification) and Service (implied or direct operating system identification) 
fingerprinting features of Nmap.  These two separate Nmap scans are referred to as the 
Nmap OS Class test and the Nmap Service test.  An aggressive OS fingerprinting scan 
uses both tests as shown by the following command: nmap –p 1-65535 –T4 –O –A –v –
sV –max-os-tries 10 –PE –PS22,25,80 –PA21,23,80,3389 –fuzzy –osscan-guess 
10.1.2.67-70.  The parameters used in the Nmap command are detailed below: 
• -p 1-65535:  identifies the port range to scan 
• -T4:  enables more aggressive timing for quicker response 
• -O:  enables operating system fingerprinting 
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• -A:  enables version detection 
• -v:  enables verbosity to list additional operating system related details 
• -sV:  enables server version fingerprinting 
• --max-os-tries 10:  increases the number of operating system queries to ten 
• --fuzzy and –osscan-guess:  forces Nmap to make are more aggressive guess 
The parameters listed above, enable aggressive TCP/IP and Service scanning.  
The max-os-tries parameter increases the number of operating system detection queries 
Nmap makes from the default two to ten (to allow for better correlation between 
fingerprints and known hosts in Nmap’s database).  Both the –fuzzy and –osscan-guess 
parameters forces Nmap to show the closest match in its signature base for the operating 
system detected.  The –fuzzy and –osscan-guess parameters increases the effectiveness of 
Nmap’s operating system detection as is evidenced by the results in Section 5.2.1.   
2.4.2 Nessus 
Nessus is another powerful tool that does multiple OS detection schemes.  Nessus 
uses over fourteen advanced operating system fingerprinting techniques [Gul09].  These 
fingerprinting techniques include: banner grabbing, HTTP requests, HTTP responses, 
SinFP algorithm (a new algorithm that detects the operating system using a single open 
port response), SMB, ICMP (using Xprobe techniques), and several others.   
Nessus version 4.2.2 is installed on January 14, 2011 and for use during the 
obfuscation effectiveness experiment.  Nessus is selected because Nessus incorporates 
several fingerprinting agent techniques.  Along with doing several TCP/IP scans similar 
to Nmap’s TCP/IP scans, Nessus uses the following techniques to detect the operating 
system and services [Gul09]: 
• os_fingerprint_html:  uses HTML (Hyper-Text Markup Language) content returned 
by certain HTTP requests to fingerprint the remote operating system. 
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• os_fingerprint_http:  uses the remote web server signature to infer the version of 
Windows or Linux running on the target. 
• os_fingerprint_sinfp:  uses the SinFP TCP/IP fingerprinting algorithm and only 
requires one open port to fingerprint an operating system. 
• os_fingerprint_smb:  identifies the operating system based on Windows SMB 
queries. 
• os_fingerprint_ssh: identifies the remote OS by the SSH banner. 
• os_fingerprint_xprobe: identifies the operating system type and version by sending 
incorrect ICMP requests. 
The os_fingerprint_html script allows Nessus to use HTML content returned by 
HTTP Response packets to identify the operating system which is very useful against 
Microsoft IIS web servers that have default home pages or error pages.  The 
os_fingerprint_http script uses the server field in an HTTP Response packet as well as 
other distinguishing HTTP header fields to identify the OS.  The os_fingerprint_smb 
script identifies the OS based on the differences between parameters used for a Linux and 
Windows computer as well as looking for Native OS fields that are returned from certain 
SMB queries.   
Nessus emulates Xprobe, another popular operating system fingerprinting 
program so Xprobe was eliminated as a tool needed to test against.  The Nessus scripts 
indicate how Nessus attempts to correlate running services on a target to the underlying 
operating system running on that target.  The SinFP algorithm is one of the newer 
techniques used to detect a target’s operating system that Nessus incorporates into its 
operating system detection process.   
The Nessus policy that is created to fingerprint each host enables all possible 
scanning options, uses the “default” Port Scan Range, and uses all plugins available when 
Nessus was downloaded.  This policy allows for a comprehensive scan against the target 
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host.  Nessus, similar to Nmap, returns two separate test results – Nessus OS Class test 
and Nessus Service test – and each test is used to identify the target’s operating system. 
2.4.3 Xprobe 
Another robust and popular fingerprinting tool is called Xprobe.  Nessus 
implements the Xprobe technique with its os_fingerprint_xprobe.nals script [Gul09].  
Ofir Arkin developed Xprobe after extensively studying the ICMP protocol and how 
ICMP can be utilized to determine host-level information [Ark02] [Ark01].  Xprobe is 
capable of determining the host’s operating system by only sending one datagram 
[Ark02].  Xprobe differs from Nmap because Nmap relies heavily on TCP while Xprobe 
relies solely on ICMP.   
 Xprobe, unlike Nmap, does not use malformed packets but instead relies 
completely on the response from standard ICMP Request packets [Ark02].  One of the 
more powerful scans Xprobe performs deals with ICMP error messages.  An operating 
system’s implementation of the TCP/IP stack varies dramatically when responding to 
ICMP error messages.  An ICMP error message is made up of the IP header and at least 
the first eight bytes of the IP packet payload [Ark02].  Some operating system echo back 
more than just the first eight bytes of the IP packet payload.  The ICMP specification in 
RFC 1122 does not dictate the size of the echoed payload [Ark02]; therefore each 
operating system vendor has their own unique implementation.   
 As is the case of a non-zero value in the code field for an ICMP ping packet, some 
operating systems ignore certain RFC specifications for ICMP traffic.  The specification 
in the RFC states that the code value provided in the request should be echoed back in the 
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reply.  Both Windows and Novell operating systems instead echo back a zero for the code 
value [Kol05].  Xprobe uses several IP header fields with different types of ICMP 
messages to identify the host.    
2.4.4 Languard 
The Languard Network Security Scanner (LNSS) tool is designed for network 
administrators to quickly identify hosts on the LAN.  The LNSS tool does banner 
grabbing, SNMP scans, SMB scans, and Null session scans [Kol05].  Some of these scans 
are also possible from both Xprobe, Nessus, and Nmap, while the Null session scan is 
becoming more obsolete as newer operating systems block these requests.      
2.4.5 p0f 
 A popular passive fingerprinting tool is called p0f.  p0f relies on three different 
types of TCP packets to determine the operating system of the host – SYN, SYN+ACK, 
and RST+ [Kol05].  Each type of test utilizes a larger range of associated fingerprint files 
to identify the host OS.  The same fingerprinting techniques used in p0f have led to actual 
network attack tools such as Ettercap and Siphon [Kol05].  Since p0f is a passive 
fingerprinting tool, p0f waits to receive TCP traffic from the host without initiating the 
communication.  The techniques employed by p0f are used by Nmap and Nessus during 
their active fingerprint scanning. 
2.5 Obfuscations Approaches 
Two separate approaches exist to obfuscate host-level information.  Network-
based host obfuscation obfuscates or normalizes host information at the intra-network 
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level by placing an obfuscation device that intercepts and obfuscates all network traffic 
leaving the local area network.  A host-based approach concentrates on obfuscating hosts 
using a one-on-one approach instead of obfuscating all the hosts’ packets from an entire 
subnet or local area network and is not limited to obfuscating only packets that leave the 
local area network.   
2.5.1 Network-Based Obfuscation Techniques 
Host obfuscation provides a proactive approach to hardening the TCP/IP stack of 
a host [KaS10].  Most of the network-based host-level obfuscation techniques fall into 
one of three categories: a transport scrubber, a proxy server, or a traffic normalizer.   
Transport scrubbers attempt to remove protocol related ambiguities from network 
traffic.  The research done with transport scrubbing implements a new network-level 
device placed on the inside interface of a firewall or IDS [SMJ00].    By placing the 
transport scrubber as a bridged device between all the hosts on the LAN and the firewall 
or IDS, the transport scrubber can remove all the LAN-generated protocol ambiguities 
allowing the IDS to see common, standard protocol implementations [SMJ00].   
To date, no further research has been found that has combined the transport 
scrubber device with a firewall or IDS.  This research would be crucial in providing a 
more efficient and effective host-level obfuscation.  The transport scrubbers, or 
fingerprint scrubbers, become another bottleneck in network traffic and another possible 
attack vector.  Current transport scrubbers run on the FreeBSD version of Linux and only 
operate on the TCP and IP layers [SMJ00].  Transport scrubbing has been found to be 
effective against several fingerprinting techniques [SMJ00] but has not been fully tested 
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against a fingerprinting program that utilizes multiple fingerprinting techniques to 
identify the host’s operating system, such as Nmap and Nessus.      
Traffic normalization is a similar approach to transport scrubbing.  The goal of 
traffic normalization is to preserve well-behaved network protocols while cleaning any 
misbehaving traffic [HPK04].  Both traffic normalization and transport scrubbing change 
field values in IP headers, specifically: fragment offset, DF flag, and TTL [HPK04].  The 
difference lies in that transport scrubbers consist of two interfaces – one interface is 
considered trusted and the other untrusted while traffic normalization does not make a 
distinction [HPK04].   
 Both traffic normalization and transport scrubbing can defeat stealthy port 
scanning techniques because normalization and scrubbing remove ambiguities from all 
packets and does not filter packets.  Traffic normalization faces the same inherit benefits 
and disadvantages as transport scrubbing.  Traffic normalizers can be bypassed in the 
case of a cold restart of the traffic normalizer.  A session that is initiated prior to the 
startup of the traffic normalizer will continue without being normalized (to not interfere 
with TCP and IP checksums for that session’s traffic) [HPK04].  Normalizers struggle to 
accurately determine when a TCP connection has been reset [HPK04].  Traffic 
normalizers and scrubbers remove a limited set of protocol ambiguities. 
 A proxy server, used for host obfuscation, operates by making a request to the 
host and responding back to the original requester with a modified response from the 
host.  If the proxy server receives a packet (e.g., a fingerprinting scan), the proxy server 
does not forward the packet onto the target host, but instead initiates a new connection 
directly to the host requesting the information.  When the host responds back to the proxy 
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server, the proxy server then eliminates a pre-configured set of host information and 
sends the modified reply back to the original requester.  The proxy server method 
decreases network performance by introducing a new bottleneck of network traffic and 
only removes a limited set of ambiguities [MaB10]. 
2.5.1.1 Network-Based Obfuscation Devices 
The primary focus of host obfuscation has been dedicated at the network level for 
Windows hosts.  These network level defenses include: Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS), firewalls, and proxies utilizing the obfuscation 
methods previously detailed.  Host-level information cannot be protected by relying on 
network level protection alone because network-level protection is not efficient or robust 
at protecting multiple host operating systems.  
Network devices may address a few of the external attack vectors of external 
fingerprinting techniques but can be bypassed.  Several fingerprinting programs identify 
firewall rule sets that then allow the attacker to craft special fingerprinting packets to 
bypass the firewall rule sets [Wol02].  A fingerprinting technique, used to bypass a 
firewall or IDS, uses slow and distributed scans, which provide a stealthy way to 
fingerprint a host behind a firewall [Yui06].   
Network security devices are dependent on their TCP/IP stack implementation 
which differs from the possible wide range of host operating system implementations 
located on the local area network behind the network-level device [HPK04].  Since the 
protocol standards do not accurately specify the behavior of the protocols, the network-
level device implements different aspects of the undefined protocols specifications. 
39 
 
 A firewall or IDS does not know how to treat network traffic similar to how the 
traffic will be treated by the host operating system [Tal03].  The protection mechanisms 
implemented on a network-level security device vary greatly and are dependent on the 
configuration established by a network administrator [LiT08].   
The benefits of obfuscating host information at the network level are primarily the 
ease of implementation, manageability, and utilizing existing network security resources.  
Network-level security devices are already examining all the traffic entering and leaving 
a LAN.  Obfuscating at the network-level can better ensure that all hosts inside the LAN 
have at least some type of host-level obfuscation but cannot ensure that all network traffic 
from each host is obfuscated.   
2.5.2 Host-Based Obfuscation Techniques 
Two separate host-based implementations are examined – obfuscating the TCP/IP 
stack implementation of the host and protocol stack virtualization.  Current host-based 
obfuscation programs deal with changing aspects of the TCP/IP stack implementation 
and primarily not with protocol stack virtualization.  Changes to the TCP/IP protocol 
stack are dependent upon the operating system and the specific program used.  Protocol 
stack virtualization is, to date, more of a proof of concept and not actually a fully 
functional implementation for host obfuscation [LiT08].   
The goal of protocol stack virtualization is to create separate instances of the 
protocol stack for each service [LiT08].  Each service uses a distinct set of identifiers so 
that the host’s network interface card (NIC) can send the packet to the correct service.  
Protocol stack virtualization’s main advantage is obfuscating which services actually 
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belong to a specific host to provide the illusion of many additional hosts, each running a 
single service [LiT08].  This approach helps uncorrelate certain fingerprinting scans that 
are typically used to validate each other.  Some fingerprinting programs, such as Xprobe 
and SinFP, pride themselves on the ability to accurately determine the operating system 
of the host using minimal packets.  Reducing the number of useful open port responses 
might not provide any obfuscation benefits beyond deceiving an attacker regarding the 
services found on each host and the number of hosts on the LAN.  Instead, the research 
behind protocol stack virtualization encourages combining protocol virtualization with 
either TCP scrubbing or traffic normalization [LiT08].   
2.5.2.1 Host-Based Obfuscation Tools 
Host-based obfuscation programs are located directly on the host device and 
intercept the network traffic before the traffic leaves the host.  Host-based approaches, 
similar to scrubbing and normalization, attempt to remove ambiguities and identifying 
features found in protocol implementations. 
Most host-based obfuscation programs run only on a Linux operating system.  A 
well-documented host-based obfuscation program is called IP Personality.  IP Personality 
is effective at fooling some Nmap scans by changing the characteristics of the TCP/IP 
stack implementation of the host [RoS01].    IP Personality can change the TCP Initial 
Sequence Number (ISN), the TCP initial window size, the TCP options (types, values and 
their order), the IP ID numbers, and can answer some pathological TCP and UDP packets 
[RoS01].   
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IP Personality allows a user to select which operating system the host should 
impersonate by automatically changing the necessary TCP/IP stack implementation.  IP 
Personality hooks into the Linux kernel using the netfilter hook.  IP Personality also 
works as a network-based host obfuscator by installing IP Personality on a Linux firewall 
or IDS system [Ber03].  In this regard, IP Personality can be directly installed on all 
Linux hosts as well as installed on a Linux firewall which will then obfuscate the rest of 
the network traffic originating from non-Linux operating systems including Windows 
operating systems.  This dual approach helps cover external fingerprinting vectors but 
does not address malware or internal vectors towards non-Linux machines.  IP 
Personality is effective against standard TCP fingerprinting scans but does not provide 
the same obfuscation benefits against ICMP-related scans or Application layer protocols.  
IP Personality is primarily an IP scrubber [KaS10] because of its focus on scrubbing or 
normalizing the IP header.   
Stealth patch is another Linux kernel TCP anti-fingerprinting tool.  This tool does 
not obfuscate the TCP/IP stack implementation but merely discards the following TCP/IP 
packets:  packets with both the SYN and FIN flag activated, if the packet has the reserved 
bit set in the TCP header or none of the TCP flags set, and packets with the FIN, PSH and 
URG flags set [Ber03].   
Additional Linux-based obfuscation tools such as IPLog and Blackhole can 
implement TCP/IP stack changes similar to IP Personality by changing values of the 
TCP/IP stack and dropping malformed packets instead of allowing the operating system 
to reply.  These additional tools are still useful, but provide more limited obfuscation 
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techniques and diversions [Ber03].  Several fingerprinting techniques do not rely on 
malformed packets to obtain host-level information. 
 The tools listed primarily obfuscate only portions of the TCP/IP stack and only 
run on Linux operating systems.  In order to obfuscate banner grabbing and HTTP 
fingerprinting techniques, manual changes must be made to each specific application.  In 
the case of banner grabbing, the application that is providing the banner must be 
manually changed which might not be a realistic option.  To defeat HTTP fingerprinting 
four main items must be taken into account: changing the HTTP Server field, re-
arranging HTTP headers, customizing HTTP error codes, and possibly even using an 
HTTP server plug-in [Sha04].   
 The only Windows-based obfuscation program identified is called OSfuscate.  
OSfuscate changes seven Windows registry settings as shown in Figure 17.  These 
settings change how the Windows operating system implements portions of the TCP/IP 
stack.  OSfuscate attempts to impersonate a different operating system similar to IP 
Personalilty.  OSfuscate changes some of the more heavily utilized TCP/IP header fields 
for fingerprinting, as shown in Figure 17, including: TTL, MTU and the window size.  
OSfuscate focuses on TCP and IP protocol fingerprinting methods and does not obfuscate 
additional protocols – such as ICMP, UDP, HTTP, and SMB.   
 
Figure 17:  OSfuscate Registry Changes [Cre08] 
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2.5.3 Polymorphic Approach to Host-Level Obfuscation 
Several research projects and efforts have been directed towards a polymorphic 
approach to obfuscating a host’s information.  A well documented polymorphic project is 
the DyNAT project [MPS02].  Polymorphic approaches continually change the ‘location’ 
of a particular host by changing the host’s IP address, MAC address, and/or port numbers 
used for certain applications.   
 This approach requires rigid time synchronization in order for a “trusted” host to 
be able to connect to another “trusted” host.  Each host needs to know the timing and 
mechanism used to change the network configuration of each other host.  This approach 
protects a host’s information by invalidating the location of the host, making the host 
unreachable from another un-trusted source.   
 These approaches do not actually obfuscate the host operating system or service 
(although some, like port hopping [LeT04] do obfuscate the current port number a service 
is utilizing).  The inherit problems with these architectures is that all the “trusted” hosts 
are considered trusted and know the polymorphic mechanism in place.  If a host is 
compromised, then the polymorphic mechanism becomes compromised in respect to all 
hosts which use that the same polymorphic mechanism.  Two of the fingerprinting 
vectors previously outlined – malware and internal – are not addressed by polymorphic 
approaches.  Likewise some of the polymorphic research projects can dramatically 
increase network traffic – such as, increased Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) traffic 
when the MAC address changes.  DNS mapping considerations have also yet to be fully 
considered.  
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2.5.4 Comparison of Current Obfuscation Programs  
Current obfuscation programs and tools are limited in their scope.  Table 1 shows 
the type of network traffic that each obfuscation program is able to intercept and 
obfuscate.  IP Personality and OSfuscate are the only two programs capable of 
obfuscating packets originating from a Windows operating system.  This research focuses 
on host-based obfuscation programs to ensure that all network packets would be 
obfuscated by obfuscating each packet as it leaves and enters a host.  OSfuscate is 
selected to compare against the results of the SNOS program developed during this 
research because OSfuscate is the only program that runs on a Windows operating system 
and claims to obfuscate the Windows operating system.   
Table 1:  Operating System Current Obfuscation Programs Can Obfuscate 
 Network-Based Host-Based 
IP Personality  Linux / Windows Linux 
Stealth Patch  N/A Linux 
IPLog  N/A Linux 
Blackhole  N/A Linux 
OSfuscate  N/A Windows 
 
Table 2 shows which protocols each current obfuscation program can obfuscate.  
Current programs only modify the IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols.  Table 2 shows 
the limitations of each program, particularly the limitations of OSfuscate.  OSfuscate, 
Stealth Patch, IPLog, and Blackhole only obfuscate the TCP and IP protocols.  None of 
them obfuscate Application-layer protocols.     
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Table 2:  Protocols Current Obfuscation Programs Can Obfuscate 
 IP TCP UDP ICMP HTTP SMTP SMB SSH DNS 
IP Personality  Y Y Y Y N N N N N 
Stealth Patch  Y Y N N N N N N N 
IPLog  Y Y N N N N N N N 
Blackhole  Y Y N N N N N N N 
OSfuscate  Y Y N N N N N N N 
 
2.6 Achieving Host Operating System Obfuscation 
Effective host obfuscation must follow the basic deception pattern.  Poor planning 
or implementation can leave the host more vulnerable than before the obfuscation 
technique was applied [Bec01].  Obfuscation techniques that deal with the TCP portion of 
a packet must accurately safeguard TCP Sequence Numbers, checksums, and congestion 
window size [PaF01].  The initial sequence number must still be a random generated 
number; otherwise, TCP hijacking can occur by predicting the sequence number.  
Network degradation also presents a possible hurdle into developing an effective host-
based obfuscation technique.  Host-based obfuscation requires an additional program to 
modify the network packets leaving the host and requires additional processing time for 
each created packet before the packet is sent onto the network.  Disadvantages in 
implementing host-based obfuscation are that each host must be configured and managed 
independently.     
Obfuscation techniques affect a host’s resources even though no fingerprinting 
activity is present and might never be present [WJS07].  Depending upon the obfuscation 
method, the host’s resources might become more efficiently utilized during a large 
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fingerprinting scan attempt if the obfuscation technique merely drops all malformed 
packets upon arrival [RoS01]. 
 Planning a sophisticated TCP/IP stack implementation, while not addressing 
banner messages, can nullify the obfuscation technique and must be taken into affect as 
well.  Obfuscation that does not limit the amount of chatter from a host can only be 
minimally effective – some of the sensitive host-level information is sent as a broadcast 
message to all hosts on the same subnet [Kol05].  Reducing broadcast messages can 
particularly help limit the effectiveness of passive fingerprinting.  The obfuscation must 
be verifiable from all protocols within the network traffic from a host. 
Host-based obfuscation provides another layer of information protection in 
addition to network-based protection.  To date, most research focuses on network-based 
obfuscation or the Linux operating system family for host-based obfuscation.  Host-based 
obfuscation of the Windows operating system family has received minimal attention.  By 
obfuscating all network packets, and all the protocols within a network packet, from a 
Windows operating system, this research attempts to provide a system wide obfuscation 
approach to protecting the identity of the Windows operating system and services. 
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III. Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology used including the goals, problems, and 
questions addressed by the Host-Based Systemic Network Obfuscation System.  The 
goals and approach are discussed in Section 3.1.  Section 3.2 presents the system 
boundaries.  The approach and description of the components, parameters, and metrics 
are also discussed in this chapter, in addition to the experimental process utilized.   
3.1 Problem Definition 
 Host devices often divulge sensitive information about themselves.  The exposed 
sensitive host information leaves the device more vulnerable to attack vectors.  Host 
devices divulge sensitive information directly –services publicly identify their type and 
version information – or indirectly – inferred by how a service or the underlying 
operating system creates or modifies a network packet.  These two closely related 
problems make the host more susceptible to attacks and exploits.   
Chapter 2 discussed the background of this problem and some of the work that 
had been done to correct this problem.  Current obfuscation programs and tools only 
obfuscate a very limited set of protocols and only a few are capable of obfuscating 
packets created from a Windows operating system.  The limited protocol set used by 
these programs result in the obfuscation process becoming useless because other un-
obfuscated protocols still identify the host’s operating system. 
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3.1.1 Goals 
This research hypothesizes that a host-based obfuscation approach can be an 
effective tool to defeat fingerprinting programs by obfuscating a host’s entire network 
packet.  The Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) is developed to defeat 
multiple fingerprinting techniques and provide a constant deceptive response.  The SNOS 
program obfuscates all OSI layer protocols within a network packet to provide a 
consistent and complete deception.  The network performance degradation caused by 
running the SNOS program is also analyzed. 
3.1.2 Experimental Setup 
The experimental setup uses standard Windows host services including: email, 
web, and SharePoint.  The Windows operating system provides the network services and 
packet creation which is evaluated to determine the effectiveness and performance of the 
SNOS program, a benchmark trial, and OSfuscate.    
All four host devices are virtual computers running on a VMware ESXi server 
during both experiments – obfuscation effectiveness and network latency.  Virtualization 
allows the experiments to run with exactly the same configuration to eliminate variability 
in configuration within each host.  Each experiment is repeated multiple times and started 
with the exact same configuration for each repetition.   The only variable difference 
between each trial is whether an obfuscation program – OSfuscate or SNOS – is running 
or not.   
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Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 are the two Windows operating systems.  
According to a January 2011 study, Windows XP accounts for 45.3% of all operating 
systems used and Windows Server 2003 has the highest Windows server usage [W3s11].   
 As shown in Figure 18, the infrastructure topology consists of a workstation, an 
email server, a SharePoint Services server, and a web server.  The workstation is running 
Windows XP SP3 and only offers SSH and SMB as a network service.  Windows XP and 
Windows Server 2003 enable the SMB service by default.   The remaining three host 
configurations use the Windows Server 2003 operating system.  The email server runs 
Microsoft Exchange Server 2003.  The SharePoint server runs Microsoft SharePoint 
Services 3.0 and the web server runs Apache for Windows 2.0.   
 User guides and default installation manuals are used to configure and install the 
software on all four hosts.  The Windows operating system, XP and Server 2003, are 
installed with the default selections from the installation disks.  The Exchange server is 
configured using Microsoft’s Active Directory installation guide and the Exchange 
Server 2003 installation guide [Mic05].  SharePoint is installed on the SharePoint server 
using the Windows SharePoint Services 3.0 installation guide [Mic09].  Apache is 
installed on the web server using the Apache for Windows installation guide [ASF11]. 
The Performance Monitor (Cacti) computer monitors network performance 
generated from each trial by the four hosts and records the results of the network latency 
experiment.  The Nessus/Nmap computer uses the fingerprinting programs Nmap and 
Nessus to fingerprint each host.  The Tcpreplay computer generates the network traffic 
load discussed in Section 3.5.2 for each host.  The Cacti and Tcpreplay computers 
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analyze and record the network latency experiment.  The Nessus/Nmap computer is used 
during the obfuscation effectiveness experiment. 
 
Figure 18:  Physical Setup of Experiment 
Figure 19 shows the experimental methodology used in this research.  A test 
produces a unique result.  The obfuscation effectiveness experiment uses four tests to 
compare against each trial.  Each trial produces four test results for each of the four hosts.  
The network latency experiment used one test, roundtrip time.   A trial is defined as a 
complete set of tests for all four hosts.  The obfuscation effectiveness experiment has 
three trials – no obfuscation (benchmark), OSfuscate, and SNOS.  Trial results are used 
to compare the effectiveness of each obfuscation program with the benchmark. 
An experimental run, or repetition, is defined as a complete set of trials.  The 
obfuscation effectiveness metric has forty runs and each run is composed of the three 
separate trials – benchmark, OSfuscate, and SNOS.  An experiment constitutes a 
complete set of repetitions.  Two independent metrics, obfuscation effectiveness and 
network latency, are identified; therefore, two separate experiments are run for each 
metric.  Figure 19 shows the three trials of the obfuscation effectiveness experiment that 
 
are repeated forty times to complete the experiment.
network latency experiment because OSfuscate only modifies Windows registry settings 
and is not a live program intercepting and modifying packets to affect network latency.
Figure 
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  OSfuscate is not tested during the 
19: Experiment Methodology 
 
 
 
3.2 System Boundaries 
The system under test include
and hardware – involved in providing network
is a host-based network traffic obfuscation system
of the system.  The Systemic Network Obfuscation System 
meaning that the components of the system c
consists of several components
obfuscation tool.  The obfuscation 
NIC, host applications – including the 
are considered black box objects 
components are used.   
Figure 20
3.3  System Services 
The primary service of the Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) 
provides network packet obfuscation.  
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 traffic obfuscation.  The system under test 
, SNOS.  Figure 20 shows an overview 
is a white box system 
ould be examined.  The system under test 
 – the host, network interface card, an adversary,
program is identified as a component under test.  
operating system and services – and virtualization
because only the inputs and outputs of these 
: Systemic Network Obfuscation System 
The outcomes of this service are a success or 
– 
 and 
The 
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failure – either the host cannot be fingerprinted or the hosts are still able to be 
fingerprinted.  A success is measured only when the fingerprinting program, Nmap or 
Nessus, is not able to identify the host operating system; otherwise, the obfuscation 
service fails.   
3.3.1 Service By Component 
 The component under test, SNOS, provides two services – header and payload 
obfuscation, and TCP session state preservation.  SNOS uses a Network Driver Interface 
Specification (NDIS) Intermediate driver called Winpkfilter.  The NDIS Intermediate 
driver functions on the Logical Link Control (LLC) layer of the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model which corresponds to the layer between the protocol and the 
miniport layers of a Windows operating system shown in Figure 21.   
Windows operating systems, since Windows XP and Server 2003, implement a 
section within the Network Device Implementation Standard (NDIS) stack called an 
Intermediate driver.  NDIS Intermediate drivers can intercept all network traffic in either 
direction – incoming or outgoing – and has access to the entire TCP/IP model, except the 
physical layer, as implemented on a Windows Operating System.  A network packet 
being delivered to the host works up through the layers in Figure 21 from the NIC driver, 
miniport layer, to the NDIS Intermediate layer and then to the protocol layer.  A packet 
sent by the host works down the layers.   
Winpkfilter intercepts all network traffic sent from the host as the traffic passes 
through the NDIS Intermediate layer.  SNOS interfaces with the Winpkfilter driver to 
modify the packets before sending them out on the wire or passing them up to the 
 
protocol layer.  The Winpkfilter driver c
Interfaces (API) that allow SNOS to
constantly is pulling the packets from the Winpkfilter que
Figure 21
 The Winpkfilter driver 
level program as shown Figure 
through the Winpkfilter driver
Windows operating system. By running 
capable of modifying layers two through seven of the OSI model. By i
each individual host, SNOS modifie
operating on the subnet or local area network level
3.4 Performance Metrics
 Performance metrics measure the effectiveness of the system.  
measures the performance by measuring
target and have the host create a response 
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computer.  The latency measured is the roundtrip time (RTT) recorded by the Cacti 
performance monitoring computer.   
Cacti is a free Linux-based tool used to monitor network performance.  A Perl 
script sends out ten ICMP echo request packets to each host and calculate the mean 
roundtrip time until the ICMP echo reply packets arrive.  The Perl script is continuously 
run to collect roundtrip times throughout an entire experimental trial repetition.  The Perl 
script calculates the mean for the ten ICMP packets which is used as the recorded result.   
The first trial of the network latency experiment is done without SNOS and is 
used as a benchmark to compare any difference in latency experienced when SNOS is 
enabled.  The RTT is measured in the number of microseconds for the response packet to 
reach the Cacti computer from the host.   
The obfuscation effectiveness metric measures the obfuscation program’s ability 
to correctly obfuscate packets so that fingerprinting programs are not able to identify the 
host’s operating system.  The effectiveness of SNOS is measured against two 
independent trials – one with no obfuscation (the benchmark), and the other with 
OSfuscate.  OSfuscate is a Windows program that claims to obfuscate the underlying 
Windows Operating System as discussed in Section 2.5.2.1. 
The first trial in the obfuscation effectiveness experiment fingerprints the host 
without any obfuscation program and provides a benchmark to compare against the 
second and third trials when either OSfuscate or SNOS is enabled.  The obfuscation 
effectiveness measurement is recorded in terms of the successful number of times a 
fingerprinting method is defeated out of the total number of fingerprinting tries 
attempted. 
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3.5 Parameters 
The parameters of a system directly affect the performance of the system.  
Parameters are divided into two sets – system parameters and workload parameters.  
Parameters are aspects of a system that can cause variation and change the results of an 
experiment. 
3.5.1 System Parameters 
 The Systemic Network Obfuscation System has several system parameters.  A 
virtualized host has degraded network throughput and latency caused by timing delays 
associated with virtualization overhead.   The rationale for using virtualization in this 
system is detailed in Section 3.1.2.  Since all the trials within each experiment use 
virtualization, virtualization does not affect the results between trials. 
 The applications, or services, running on the host device also affect performance.  
These applications initiate the network packet creation process and include application 
layer headers that SNOS modifies to counter operating system fingerprinting techniques.  
Each application creates its own application layer header and payload.  The applications, 
or system parameters, include a Microsoft SharePoint server, an email server, a web 
server, and a workstation running an SSH (Secure Shell) server.   
 Microsoft Exchange is the selected email server platform.  According to recent 
research done by Ferris Research, Microsoft Exchange had 66% of the email market 
share worldwide in 2008 [Fer08].   Apache is used as the web server application.  
Netcraft reported that as of January 2009, the Apache web server held 50% of the 
worldwide market share while Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) held 32% 
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[Net09].  Microsoft IIS is an essential part of Microsoft SharePoint Services and is tested 
as a part of the SharePoint server host.  SharePoint Services is selected because 83% of 
corporations use or plan to use SharePoint and almost half of those corporations utilize 
SharePoint primarily as a file sharing server [Fra09].   
Additional parameters include NIC speed, CPU speed, and memory size. These 
additional parameters are control variables and do not change throughout the experiment.  
The applications running on a particular host also function as control variables because 
each host configuration remained constant throughout both experiments.   
3.5.2 Workload Parameters 
Nmap and Nessus fingerprinting programs are used to fingerprint each host.  The 
same commands and parameters – detailed in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 – are used for 
Nmap and Nessus during the fingerprinting process.  The network traffic generated by 
each program throughout the obfuscation effectiveness experiment remains constant and 
is considered a control variable. 
 The Tcpreplay host in Figure 18 sent out specially-crafted packets to each host 
during the network latency experiment.  The Tcpreplay pcap files were originally 
captured during a simulated real world experience – the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) 
from April 2010 at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  The original pcap file was 
captured from the day with the heaviest network load during the CDX.  Using Tcpwrite 
and Wireshark, the pcap files are modified for each of the four hosts – Exchange, 
SharePoint, web, and workstation.  The IP addresses, MAC addresses, and applicable 
services are changed to correctly match the target host device.  For example, the custom 
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pcap file for the Exchange email server modified all SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol) traffic to be addressed to the Exchange email server host.  Each host has its 
own specially crafted pcap file that is used by Tcpreplay to send to the host from the 
Tcpreplay computer.   
 The custom pcap file workloads are a synthetic workload because the original 
pcap file was captured from a specific working scenario and cannot represent all possible 
workload scenarios.  A synthetic workload is the only feasible because each organization 
has a different infrastructure topology and configuration.   
 The Tcpreplay program sends the exact same packets to a host every time and is 
used to eliminate network traffic workload variance as a possible reason for individual 
results.  Tcpreplay is constant throughout each trial and repetition for the network latency 
experiment. 
3.6 Factors / Levels 
 A factor is a subset of parameters that are varied during the experiment.  SNOS 
uses two factors – obfuscation and host applications.  The obfuscation factor included 
three levels – no obfuscation, OSfuscate, and SNOS.  The host application factor has four 
levels – email server, SharePoint server, web server and workstation.  
 Table 3 shows the twelve combinations of levels and factors for the obfuscation 
effectiveness metric.  Each level, or trial, consists of four individual tests – Nmap OS 
Class, Nmap Services, Nessus OS Class, and Nessus Services – throughout the 
obfuscation effectiveness experiment.  Forty-eight individual results, or sample points, 
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(twelve factor/level combinations multiplied by four tests) are achieved each time the 
experiment is repeated (experimental run).      
Table 3: Obfuscation Effectiveness Experimental Factors and Levels 
 No Obfuscation OSfuscate (OSf) SNOS  
Email Server No obfuscation / 
Email Server 
OSf / Email Server SNOS/ Email Server 
SharePoint 
server 
No obfuscation / 
SharePoint server 
OSf / SharePoint 
Server 
SNOS / SharePoint 
server 
Web Server No obfuscation / Web 
Server 
OSf / Web Server SNOS / Web Server 
Workstation No obfuscation / 
Workstation 
OSf / Workstation SNOS / Workstation 
 
 Table 4 shows the various combinations of levels and factors for the network 
latency metric.  Each trial in the network latency experiment only has a single test, 
roundtrip time which produces eight individual results (eight factor/level combinations 
multiplied by one test) each time the experiment is repeated.   
Table 4: Network Latency Experimental Factors and Levels 
 No Obfuscation SNOS 
Email Server No obfuscation / 
Email Server 
SNOS/ Email Server 
SharePoint 
Services server 
No obfuscation / 
SharePoint Services 
server 
SNOS / SharePoint 
Services server 
Web Server No obfuscation / Web 
Server 
SNOS / Web Server 
Workstation No obfuscation / 
Workstation 
SNOS / Workstation 
 
Repeating the full experimental process several times reduces the variance of the 
results within each trial.  A full factorial design using the factors above tests every 
combination of levels for each factor.  Sufficient repetitions are performed when the 
variance between the results becomes consistent within each trial. 
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3.7  Evaluation Technique 
 The evaluation technique is emulation.  Emulation is a simulation and a 
measurement of a real system.   
3.8 Summary 
The SNOS program is created to defeat fingerprinting techniques by obfuscating 
all the OSI layers of a network packet.  The Systemic Network Obfuscation System uses 
a NDIS Intermediate driver to intercept and obfuscate the network packets.  The 
component under test is the network traffic obfuscation program – SNOS.  The 
parameters used to test the system include the network load and host applications.  A full 
factorial design determines the effect of each factor during the obfuscation process of the 
SNOS program.  The experiment is repeated to reduce variability and errors.  The results 
and responses provide the necessary data to determine the effectiveness of the 
obfuscation program in defeating the fingerprinting programs.  
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IV. SNOS Program Design 
This section provides detail regarding the design of the SNOS program, including 
why and how SNOS determines which protocols to obfuscate and what fields and/or 
payloads need obfuscation.   
4.1 Systemic Network Obfuscation System 
Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) encompasses several layers within 
the Windows network stack implementation.  NDIS drivers can be used in one of three 
locations:  the Protocol layer, the Intermediate driver layer, or the Miniport layer.  The 
Miniport layer is where a network card’s driver is located and the Protocol layer is the 
finished Protocol stack – the TCP/IP stack for this research – ready to send out through 
the network card.  The NDIS Intermediate driver layer allows a program to intercept a 
completed network packet before it is sent on the wire or received by the destined 
application on the host.   
Winpkfilter is a NDIS Intermediate driver that can intercept all network packets 
entering or leaving a host.  Winpkfilter uses a queue to store packets so that any program 
using Winpkfilter can continuously grab the packets from the queue.  The SNOS program 
loops through the Winpkfilter queue to grab all the intercepted packets.  SNOS waits 
until a notification event is set within the Winpkfilter structure which indicates a packet is 
in the queue.  SNOS then grabs the packet structure from Winpkfilter and directly 
modifies the structure by modifying the individual bits within it.   
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The Systemic Network Obfuscation System uses the Winpkfilter NDIS 
Intermediate driver so all layers, except the physical layer, of the OSI model, shown in 
Figure 22, could be modified as needed.  The software SNOS needs to function includes:  
the Winpkfilter driver and the .Net Framework 3.5 or greater.  Winpkfilter and the .Net 
Framework are installed on each host as part of the host’s base virtual image so all of the 
trials, including the benchmark, have these two programs installed and configured.  The 
only difference between the baseline and the SNOS trials is whether SNOS is running or 
not.   An important step in building SNOS is determining which protocols need to be 
obfuscated.   
4.1.1 Protocols 
A seemingly infinite list of protocols exists for various forms of network 
communication.  Protocols are used in layers two through 7 inclusive, as shown in Figure 
22, of the OSI model.  The physical layer represents the physical median that passes the 
network traffic, such as a wireless signal or Ethernet cable and does not need obfuscation. 
The colored layers in Figure 22 show the OSI layers used to obfuscate the network 
traffic. The Data Link layer in SNOS ensures that the network traffic is using the Ethernet 
protocol.  
 
Protocols are selected
network and 2) protocols used 
large organizations found that the top five protocols on 
SSL, SSH, and SMTP [DFM06]
all Application Layer protocols and therefore the protocols from the other lower layers of 
the OSI model are also obfuscated.  All five of these protocols use the IP Network Layer 
protocol and the TCP Transport Layer protocol.
Port  
80 (http) 
445 (smb) 
443 (ssl) 
22  (ssh) 
25 (smtp) 
 
The protocols that fingerprinting programs use to identify 
systems is the second criteria for selecting the protocols the SNOS program would 
obfuscate.  The most common operating system fingerprinting techniques use three 
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Figure 22: OSI Model 
 using two criteria: 1) commonly used protocols
to fingerprint an operating system.  A study based on three 
the network were: HTTP, SMB, 
, as shown in Table 5.  The five protocols identified are 
   
Table 5: Protocol Usage Study 
Connection % Connection 
97,106,281 70.82% 
4,833,919 3.53% 
3,206,369 2.344% 
2,900,876 2.12% 
2,533,617 1.85% 
a host’s operating 
 on a 
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protocols: IP, TCP, and ICMP [All07].  Additionally SNOS obfuscates protocols that 
were identified in Chapter 2 and are used by the Nmap and Nessus fingerprinting 
programs.    
The SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol did not need obfuscation (although the 
lower layers in the OSI Model still did).  SSH servers are primarily written to run on a 
Linux operating system.  OpenSSH, a Linux SSH server, can run on a Windows 
operating system inside of the Cygwin environment.  Cygwin is a Windows program 
which allows native Linux programs to run on a Windows operating system by providing 
Linux API calls.  SNOS has an SSH obfuscation method but the method is not used 
because the SSH server does not give away the underlying host operating system 
throughout any of the tests. 
4.1.2 SNOS Overview  
Figure 23 shows an overview of how SNOS inspects the network packets to 
determine if the packet needs to be obfuscated.  Packets arrive at the NDIS Intermediate 
driver layer, where SNOS uses Winpkfilter to intercept the packet before the packet 
continues to the next NDIS layer in Figure 21.  If the packet does not need obfuscation, 
then the packet is sent to the next appropriate NDIS layer.  For incoming packets, SNOS 
uses Winpkfilter to send the packet up to the protocol layer in Figure 21, and for outgoing 
packets, SNOS uses Winpkfilter to send the packet down to the miniport layer in Figure 
21. 
 
Figure 
4.1.3 SNOS Packet Modification
SNOS packet modification commence
needs obfuscation.  Figure 24
Modification” and “Modify Applicable Header Fields / Payload” 
To determine if the network packet need
is an Ethernet packet and use
SNOS focuses on IPv4 and d
If the Network protocol 
that need to be obfuscated.  SNOS obfuscat
when SNOS checks for that protocol.  For example, SNOS check
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23:  SNOS Decision Flow Overview 
 
s when SNOS determines that the packet 
 shows a detailed view into the decision “Packet Needs 
objects from 
s obfuscation, SNOS first verifies that the packet 
s the IP protocol as the packets Network layer protocol
oes not consider IPv6 packets.   
is IP, then SNOS checks for Transport layer protocols 
s protocol headers in the reverse order of 
s for the IP protocol 
 
Figure 23.  
.  
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second in the obfuscation decision making process but does not actually obfuscate the IP 
header until the very end of the obfuscation process.  This process ensures that checksum 
fields found in various protocols are accurate.  The checksums are recalculated because 
the upper layer protocols and/or payload is modified making the old checksum obsolete.  
The new checksum is copied over the old checksum in the checksum header field of the 
protocol.   
SNOS checks for ICMP packets at the same time Transport layer protocols are 
checked.  The three Transport layer protocols, including ICMP, SNOS obfuscates are 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), and ICMP.  An 
obfuscated ICMP packet is sent to the IP header obfuscation method and then to the next 
appropriate NDIS layer as Figure 23 shows. 
For UDP and TCP packets, SNOS evaluates the packet to determine if an 
Application layer protocol needs obfuscation.  Depending upon the Application layer 
protocol, SNOS distinguishes between client requests and server responses, as well as 
determining the specific response or request that is being passed.  Incoming SMB Null 
Session request packets are dropped by SNOS because Nessus is able to determine that a 
host is running a Windows operating system by connecting to SMB using a Null Session 
connection.  The SMB Null session packet is shown in Figure 24 by the “Yes” line 
originating from the “Incoming Null Request” decision and has an “X” on the line 
indicating that the packet is dropped.   
 
Figure 
The remaining Application layer protocols 
as shown in Figure 24, the packet 
obfuscation.  The packet continue
protocol for obfuscation until the packet 
layer – miniport or protocol.  
modifications that SNOS performs to defeat Nmap and Nessus.
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24: SNOS Packet Obfuscation 
are obfuscated appropriately and then, 
is passed back down to the Transport layer 
s to be forwarded to the next lower TCP/IP model layer 
is finished and forwarded to the correct
Appendix A contains the full list of protocols and 
 
 
protocol for 
 NDIS 
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4.1.4 Host Functionality While Running SNOS 
All four individual host configurations – email server, SharePoint server, web 
server, and workstation, are tested to ensure that SNOS does not affect their functionality.  
Functionality is defined as the ability for a service to operate correctly with a bare 
minimum set of features enabled.  For instance, a web server is considered fully 
functional if web related traffic functioned normally.  Integration of the selected 
applications with other possible applications or configurations not specifically mentioned 
are not tested. 
Section 4.1.1 discusses the reasoning behind the protocol selection.  These 
protocols are used to determine the types of host configurations that are tested.  Section 
3.5.1 explains the statistics used to determine the specific applications used for each 
protocol outlined in Section 4.1.1.  The applications are installed on separate host devices 
similar to production environments because email servers do not typically function as an 
organizations web and SSH server.  Likewise, workstations are not normally used to 
provide email, file sharing, or web services.  Applications and operating systems are 
installed according to configuration guides from the vendor that created the application.  
Guidelines and recommendations from the companies are followed when dividing up the 
applications onto different hosts.   
Only the protocols and services previously listed are tested.  All other protocols 
are blocked on each host.  Windows firewall is configured on each host as part of the 
base virtual image to only allow specific protocols to respond and receive connections 
throughout the experiments.  The email server primarily tests SMTP, DNS, and SMB 
traffic, the SharePoint server tests SMB and HTTP response traffic (using an IIS web 
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server), the web server tests SMB and HTTP response traffic (using an Apache web 
server), and the workstation tests SMB, DHCP, SSH and HTTP request traffic (web 
surfing).  All four hosts only test protocols mentioned in Section 4.1.1 and ignore other 
protocols inherently running on the host that are not directly used to provide functionality 
to the services being tested.   
With SNOS enabled on each of the four host devices, specific traffic is passed to 
ensure that SNOS does not block or corrupt this network traffic.  For the workstation, 
since web surfing encompasses the entire Internet and testing the full functionality of 
each website available on the Internet while running SNOS is not feasible, SNOS focuses 
on the top ten most visited internet sites [DFM06].  The workstation is considered fully 
functional for HTTP request traffic if all ten websites are functional while running SNOS.   
 SNOS purposefully blocks a portion of the SMB protocol’s functionality.  
Windows, even Windows 7, operating systems allow incoming SMB Null sessions.  To 
effectively obfuscate the host operating system, SMB Null sessions have to be blocked.  
SMB packets are still allowed and obfuscated by SNOS except for incoming SMB Null 
session requests.  By completely blocking all incoming SMB Null sessions, SNOS also 
blocks additional information that can be combed from Null session queries – such as 
enumerating local logon credentials.   
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V.  Results and Analysis 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  Section 5.1 shows the results of SNOS 
obfuscated packets.  Section 5.2 shows the results from the obfuscation effectiveness 
experiment.  Section 5.3 shows the results from the network latency experiment.  The 
obfuscation effectiveness and network latency experiments’ results are analyzed in 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
5.1 Packet Modification Results 
The Exchange server results are primarily associated with SMTP, port 25.  Since 
Exchange natively enables OWA (Outlook Web Access) by running an IIS web server, 
HTTP traffic is also used to determine if SNOS effectively modifies a packet originating 
from the Exchange server host. 
 The default SMTP banner produced by an Exchange server is shown in Figure 25.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the default SMTP Exchange banner identifies the service – 
Microsoft ESMTP Mail Service – as a Microsoft Exchange server revealing the Windows 
operating system.  The banner also identifies the exact version of Exchange (Exchange 
Server 2003) further suggesting that the host’s operating system is Windows Server 2003.  
Figure 26 shows the SNOS-modified SMTP banner.  The SNOS modified email banner 
identifies ARPANET as the email service application.  ARPANET does not infer the 
host’s operating system since no such email application exists by this name.  SNOS can 
easily be implemented to replace the banner text with random words or other characters 
instead of using ARPANET in the SMTP banner.   
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Figure 25:  SMTP Banner without SNOS 
 
 
Figure 26:  SMTP Banner Modified By SNOS 
 
 The naming convention used for the hosts is for the convenience of identifying a 
specific host during the experiments.  Outside of this research environment, naming 
conventions should not contain information about the service or operating system running 
on the host.  Naming convention problems are not a technical problem but a social 
problem within specific information technology departments.  Good naming conventions 
should not infer any information about the hosts operating system or services.  
 The standard SharePoint HTTP Response network packet is shown in Figure 27 
compared with the SharePoint HTTP Response packet after SNOS has modified it, 
Figure 28.  Without SNOS, the HTTP header identifies the web service being used – 
Microsoft-IIS/6.0, the programming language used – ASP.NET, and even explicitly 
identifies the server as running SharePoint Services.  SNOS modifies all of the HTTP 
header fields, as shown in Figure 28 so that the web server type and, by inference, the 
host’s operating system are obfuscated.  The extra fields SNOS inserts into the HTTP 
header field are chosen without any particular preference and are inserted to replace the 
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices field in Figure 27.  The Server field identifies a 
CERN web server type.  CERN was the first web server and ran on a UNIX operating 
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system and does not infer a Windows operating system.  All SNOS-modified values can 
easily be programmed to use random characters or other preferred values. 
 
Figure 27:  SharePoint HTTP Header without SNOS 
 
 
Figure 28:  SharePoint HTTP Header Modified By SNOS 
 The web server’s HTTP header is similar to SharePoint’s HTTP header in Figure 
27 and SNOS’s modified version in Figure 28.  The only difference is between the 
original HTTP Response packets is the Server, X-Powered-By and 
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices fields.  Figure 29 shows the standard HTTP response 
from the web server without SNOS’s modifications.  The server field identifies the 
Windows operating system.  The SNOS program modified the Server field for the web 
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server identical to the SharePoint server’s server field – CERN11/7.0.87 – shown in 
Figure 28.   
 
Figure 29:  Web HTTP Header without SNOS 
The User-Agent HTTP Request header field identifies the web browser type and 
version.  The unmodified Internet Explorer created HTTP Request packet is shown in 
Figure 30 - the User-Agent field identifies the host’s operating system as a Windows 
operating system using Internet Explorer 8.  The SNOS modified HTTP request packet is 
shown in Figure 31.  The User-Agent field is modified to resemble a Mozilla Firefox web 
browser running on a Linux operating system.   
 
Figure 30:  HTTP Request without SNOS 
 
 
Figure 31:  HTTP Request Modified By SNOS 
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Effective operating system obfuscation requires ICMP packet obfuscation.  ICMP 
packets are highly variable between operating systems.  Figure 32 is a standard Windows 
ICMP echo reply packet.  To obfuscate the ICMP packet, as shown in Figure 33, SNOS 
creates a random Identifier number, changes the length of the ICMP payload from 32 
bytes to 56 bytes, and changes the payload characters from the Windows default alphabet 
to random characters.   
 
Figure 32:  ICMP without SNOS 
 
 
Figure 33:  ICMP Modified By SNOS 
Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 operating systems enable the SMB 
protocol by default, so the SMB protocol is tested, and obfuscated on each of the four 
host devices.  SMB Response packets – particularly the Session Setup AndX Response 
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packet – identify the host operating system and the service providing SMB.  Figure 34 
shows the default Windows SMB response packet – identifying the operating system as 
either Windows XP or Windows Server 2003.  The Native OS and Native Lan Manager 
fields inside a SMB AndX Response packet identify the host’s operating system.  SNOS 
obfuscates the Native OS and Native Lan Manager fields, shown in Figure 35, to imitate 
a Linux operating system running Samba.  Samba can be installed on a Linux operating 
system to allow a Linux host to share and communicate with the Windows SMB service.  
The flags are also changed by SNOS. 
 
Figure 34:  SMB Response without SNOS 
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Figure 35:  SMB Response Modified By SNOS 
 
   A complete list of SNOS obfuscation modifications is shown in Appendix A.  
This list includes additional obfuscation not specifically referenced in this section.   
5.2 Obfuscation Effectiveness Results 
The obfuscation effectiveness experiment tests the obfuscation effectiveness 
metric.  The results of this experiment determine the success or failure of SNOS in 
obfuscating the Windows operating system.  The obfuscation effectiveness experiment 
consists of three separate trials - each repeated forty times, and each trial consists of four 
separate tests, as explained in Section 3.6.  The baseline trial is used to compare the 
obfuscation effectiveness of the two programs tested – OSfuscate and SNOS.  After forty 
experimental runs, the experiment yields 1,920 individual results corresponding to a 
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specific fingerprinting test against a specific host.  Appendix B contains the results of the 
forty experimental runs.  The results are detailed in the following sections and are 
initially divided into the four tests – Nmap OS Class, Nmap Service, Nessus OS Class, 
and Nessus Service. 
5.2.1 Nmap OS Class Test 
The Nmap OS Class test is the process Nmap uses to directly detect a host’s 
operating system.  The Nmap OS Class test is run against each host during each trial.   
Figure 36 is a screenshot from the Nmap OS Class test for the benchmark trial.  
Figure 36 shows the ports the Nmap OS Class test used to identify the host and a list of 
possible operating systems.  The benchmark trial always yields an accurate operating 
system fingerprint – Windows XP or Windows Server 2003.  Figure 36 represents the 
results of the Nmap OS Class test for the Exchange server during the benchmark trial.  
The other three hosts return identical results with the only difference being the port 
numbers the Nmap OS Class uses to fingerprint the operating system.   
 
Figure 36:  Nmap OS Class – Benchmark Trial 
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During the benchmark trial, the Nmap OS Class confidence level is 100% for 
thirty-eight out of the forty repetitions.  One result for the SharePoint host is 99% 
confident and another result for the workstation host is 98% confident.  In both cases, the 
Nmap OS Class only identifies Windows as the possible operating system matching the 
fingerprint. 
The OSfuscate trial produces similar results as the benchmark.  The Nmap OS 
Class test identifies the Windows operating system every time by using the same port 
numbers for each host as the benchmark trial.  The difference between the benchmark 
and the OSfuscate trials is that Nmap OS Class is less confident that the fingerprint result 
is accurate.  Nmap suggests additional operating systems as a possible fingerprint match 
besides the Windows operating system.  This difference is inconsequential because the 
Nmap OS Class test still identifies the Windows operating system every time.  The 
confidence level of Nmap for the OS Class test remains over 85% for all results produced 
during the OSfuscate trial.   
Figure 37 shows a result from the OSfuscate trial and how Nmap associates 
additional operating systems to the fingerprint.  These devices include switches, printers, 
and routers.  Since the Nmap OS Class test is no longer 100% confident with the results 
accuracy, Nmap displays a comprehensive list of possible operating systems that could be 
running on the host.  This result can be considered a form of obfuscation.  Several times 
the additional operating systems, such as the Dell PowerConnect operating system, are 
listed with a higher confidence interval, by 1% or 2% more than Windows.  The purpose 
of this research is not to determine the confidence level of Nmap or how that confidence 
level might be interpreted by a wide range of potential users.  If Windows is listed as a 
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result of the Nmap OS Class test then the test is considered successful at identifying the 
host’s operating system. 
 
Figure 37:  Nmap OS Class – OSfuscate Trial 
The Nmap OS Class is never able to accurately identify the host’s operating 
system for any of the four hosts during the SNOS trial.  The Nmap OS Class test uses the 
same port as the benchmark trial to fingerprint the host for all four hosts.  The Nmap OS 
Class test results shows that the operating system is a Dell PowerConnect management 
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switch – as shown in Figure 38, a firewall or at times failed to provide a guess.  The 
Nmap OS Class produces an 80-90% confidence level when identifying the host as a Dell 
PowerConnect or firewall operating system.  
Unlike the OSfuscate trial, the Nmap OS Class test results for the SNOS trial 
never list Windows as a possible operating system matching the fingerprint.  SNOS 
successfully obfuscates the host operating system such that the Nmap OS Class test no 
longer lists the Windows operating system.  Whether or not a wrong result is better or 
worse than no result is not examined further because the significance of this difference 
depends upon individual user evaluation.  Additional studies and discussions would need 
to address which result would be more favorable in order to obfuscate the operating 
system from the user.  Results identified are all or nothing regarding success in 
obfuscating the Windows operating system. 
 
Figure 38:  Nmap OS Class – SNOS Trial 
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Under the benchmark trial – “No Obfuscation” – shown in Figure 39, the Nmap 
OS Class test is able to successfully identify the operating system for each host.  The 
individual cells under the “No Obfuscation” column indicate if the Nmap OS Class is 
successful with either a Y for yes or N for no, the port number Nmap OS Class uses to 
fingerprint the operating system, and the confidence percentage.  Nmap is at least 98% 
confident in the result of the Nmap OS Class fingerprint throughout all forty 
experimental runs for the “No Obfuscation,” benchmark, trial.  Appendix B contains the 
full results from all forty experimental runs.   
SNOS successfully obfuscates the host’s operating system as noted by the “N” 
under the SNOS column in Figure 39.  The port number after the “N” indicates the port 
number that the Nmap OS Class test uses to fingerprint the operating system.  The 
percentage shows the confidence level for the listed operating system that Nmap matches 
to the fingerprint.  The SharePoint cell under the SNOS column has no port number or 
confidence level because Nmap OS Class could not match the results to a known 
fingerprint signature in Nmap’s database. 
 
Figure 39:  Nmap OS Class Experimental Run 
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 Appendix B contains the full results recorded from the Nmap OS Class test 
against each host.  Figure 36, 37, and 38 are taken from experimental run thirty-eight and 
represent the row labeled Exchange as identified in Figure 39. 
5.2.2 Nmap Service Test 
The Nmap Service test uses Nmap’s ability to fingerprint a host’s services.  The 
Nmap Service test is considered as significant as the Nmap OS Class test in determining 
the effectiveness of SNOS relative to the benchmark and compared against OSfuscate 
because services, directly or through inference, identify the host’s operating system. 
Figure 40 shows the results from the Nmap Service test performed against the 
Exchange server host.  Figure 40 only shows the results for protocols previously selected 
for obfuscation.  Additional identified protocols are ignored as part of the result returned 
from the Nmap Service test.  
The result of each identified service is considered successful in identifying the 
operating system if, under the Version column, the Nmap Service test identifies the 
operating system.  In Figure 40, Nmap Service identifies port 25 as running Microsoft 
ESMTP – which is Microsoft Exchange; therefore inferring the Windows operating 
system.  Port 80 allows for a similar inference based on the Version information 
identified as Microsoft IIS.  Port 445, SMB, produces the most concise information by 
specifically identifying the operating system as being Windows Server 2003 or Windows 
Server 2008.   
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Figure 40:  Nmap Service – Benchmark 
 The Nmap Service test produces the exact same result when run during the 
OSfuscate trial for each host.   Figure 41 represents the results returned during the 
OSfuscate trial with no differences reported throughout the entire experiment – all forty 
experimental repetitions on all four hosts.   
 
Figure 41:  Nmap Service – OSfuscate 
 For both the benchmark and OSfuscate trials against the Workstation host, Nmap 
Service occasionally does not identify port 445’s version information, as shown in Figure 
42.  During the benchmark trial for the Nmap Service test, the workstation’s operating 
system is not identified 37% of the time (15 out of 40) and during the OSfucate trial, the 
workstation’s operating system is not identified 35% of the time (14 out of 40).  The 
inability of Nmap Service to indentify port 445’s version information is further discussed 
in Section 5.4.1 as part of the analysis of the Nmap results.   
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Figure 42:  Nmap Service – Workstation SMB Not Identified 
 The results from the Nmap Service test for the Exchange server host during the 
SNOS trial are shown in Figure 43.  The Nmap Service is unable to identify any of the 
obfuscated protocols as shown by the empty Version column in Figure 43.   
 
Figure 43:  Nmap Service – SNOS 
 The Nmap Service test results from all three trials are shown in Appendix B under 
the Nmap Service column.  Figure 40, 41, and 43 represent the data used to populate the 
Exchange row in Figure 44.  Each cell in Figure 44 has a “Y” if Nmap Service identifies 
the Windows operating system or an “N” if Nmap Service does not identify the Windows 
operating system.  Except for the occasional lack of Version information for port 445 on 
the workstation, the protocols used to identify the host’s operating system are identical 
between the benchmark and OSfuscate trials.  These trials result in the Nmap Service test 
correctly identifying the underlying operating system 135 out of 160 times and 136 out of 
85 
 
160 times for the benchmark and OSfuscate trials, respectively.  The SNOS trial results in 
the Nmap Service test never being able to identify the correct operating system during all 
forty repetitions on all four hosts or 0 out of 160 results.  
 
Figure 44:  Nmap Service Experimental Run 
5.2.3 Nessus OS Class Test 
Similar to Nmap, Nessus uses multiple operating system and service 
fingerprinting techniques.  The Nessus OS Class test is also referred to as Nessus OS 
Identification.  The Nessus OS Class test results are found inside the 0/tcp subsection of a 
Nessus report.   
The Nessus report does not detail the ports used to fingerprint the operating 
system.  Instead, the Nessus OS Class test uses the techniques discussed in Section 2.4.2.  
The Nessus OS Class results from the SNOS trial provide information about how Nessus 
uses operating system fingerprinting techniques.  The SNOS trial does not produce an 
operating system match, so Nessus displays the fingerprint created from the test.   
Figure 45 shows the result of one of the benchmark trial runs against the 
Exchange server.  Nessus is able to accurately detect the exact type and version of the 
operating system running.  The confidence level of 99 shown in Figure 45 remains 
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constant every time Nessus OS Class is able to correctly fingerprint the operating system 
for the benchmark and OSfuscate trials.   
The Nessus OS Class test reports the method as MSRPC used to fingerprint the 
operating system but does not completely identify the techniques used.  Even when all 
MSRPC related ports are blocked by Windows firewall on the host, Nessus still reports 
the method as MSRPC because of ports 139 and 445 which are used by SMB. 
 
Figure 45:  Nessus OS Class - Benchmark 
 An OSfuscate trial result is shown in Figure 46.  The results from the OSfuscate 
and the benchmark trials are identical as shown by comparing Figure 45 with Figure 46.  
Nessus OS Class is able to accurately fingerprint the operating system’s type and version.  
These results are identical for all four hosts during all forty repetitions of the benchmark 
and OSfuscate trials. 
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Figure 46:  Nessus OS Class – OSfuscate 
 A SNOS trial result, Figure 47, shows that Nessus OS Class fails to identify the 
operating system of the host.  Under the Synopsis section, Nessus OS Class states, “it was 
not possible to guess the remote system.”  The plug-in output in Figure 47 shows the 
methods Nessus OS Class tries to use to identify the operating system.  The HTTP output 
displays the server field from the HTTP response packet.  The SinFP output is the 
fingerprint created by the SinFP algorithm that Nessus cannot match to an operating 
system fingerprint within Nessus’ database.   
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Figure 47:  Nessus OS Class – SNOS 
Figure 48 shows experimental run, repetition, number nineteen.  Figure 45, 46, 
and 47 are represented by the Exchange server row in Figure 48.  The results produced 
within each trial throughout the forty experimental runs are identical.  Nessus OS Class is 
able to correctly identify the operating system 100% of the time for the benchmark and 
OSfuscate trials and 0% of the time for the SNOS trial.  The Y, yes, in Figure 48 records 
that Nessus OS Class correctly identifies the operating system, and the N, no, means that 
Nessus does not identify the Windows operating system.  The protocols listed in the cells 
represent the protocols Nessus OS Class uses to fingerprint the operating system.  The 
complete results of all forty repetitions are attached as Appendix B. 
89 
 
 
Figure 48:  Nessus OS Class Experimental Run 
5.2.4 Nessus Service Test 
The Nessus Service test results are not as easily viewable as the Nmap Service test 
results.  The Nmap Service test lists all the detected services and any identified 
information about each service under the Ports / Hosts tab.  The report generated by 
Nessus requires selecting each detected protocol and then viewing the protocols details to 
determine if the Nessus Service test identifies the service and/or operating system.  
Figure 49 shows how Nessus lists the detected services.  Only the services relating to the 
protocols selected for this research are shown and used as a means of detecting the 
underlying operating system.   
 
Figure 49:  Nessus Service –Service List 
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The Exchange server host uses SMTP, HTTP and SMB as shown in Figure 49.  
The benchmark trial correctly identifies the server type and version running SMTP by 
looking at the SMTP banner as shown in Figure 50.   
 
Figure 50:  Nessus Service – Benchmark - SMTP 
Nessus Service identifies the HTTP application running by looking at the server 
field inside of the HTTP response packet shown in Figure 51.  The server field identifies 
the Microsoft IIS web server which infers the host is using a Windows operating system.  
Nessus also displays the entire HTTP Response packet header which identifies the web 
application server running by viewing the Content-Location field and X-Powered-By 
fields as shown in Figure 52.  The Content-Location field identifies the iisstart.htm 
default page which is the default webpage for the Microsoft IIS web server.  The X-
Powered-By field indicates the programming/scripting language used by the web server 
as ASP.NET which natively runs on a Microsoft IIS web server.   
 
Figure 51:  Nessus Service – Benchmark - HTTP 
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Figure 52:  Nessus Service – Benchmark - HTTP Response Header 
The SharePoint server HTTP Response header contains additional fields as shown 
in Figure 53.  The HTTP Response header identifies that the server is running Microsoft 
SharePoint Services.  The Nessus Service test creates a separate item, similar to the 
Server field in the HTTP Response header that identifies Microsoft SharePoint Services 
running on the host.   
 
Figure 53:  Nessus Service – Benchmark – SharePoint HTTP Header Response 
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 A Nessus Service result for the SMB protocol is shown in Figure 54.  Figure 54 is 
the AndX Session Setup SMB command sent back from a host.  The AndX Session Setup 
SMB packet identifies the operating system using the Native OS, and Native Lan 
Manager fields.  Using this packet, Nessus Service accurately identifies the exact type 
and version of the operating system running – Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2.   
 
 
Figure 54:  Nessus Service – Benchmark – SMB 
 Nessus Service attempts to connect to the detected SMB port using a Null Session 
request.  If Nessus is able to connect with a Null Session, then Nessus Service identifies 
the operating system as a Windows operating system, shown in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55:  Nessus Service – Benchmark – SMB Null Session 
 The Nessus Service results during the OSfuscate trial are identical to the 
benchmark trial for each service on all four hosts.  OSfuscate does not obfuscate any 
information regarding any of the services fingerprinted by the Nessus Service test.   
 The SNOS trial produces successful results in defeating the Nessus Service test 
for each protocol.  Nessus grabs the SMTP banner in the SNOS trial, Figure 56, but the 
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SMTP banner does not infer the Windows operating system because the banner provides 
false information regarding the SMTP service running.   
 
Figure 56:  Nessus Service – SNOS – SMTP 
The HTTP service detected by Nessus does not identify the correct service type 
and version running and does not give information inferring the Windows operating 
system.  Figure 57 shows the HTTP service information that Nessus reported. 
 
Figure 57:  Nessus Service – SNOS - HTTP 
The HTTP response header that Nessus reports is obfuscated by SNOS in Figure 
58.  The Content-Location field is modified and other fields, such as the X-Powered-By 
field and the MicrosoftSharepointServices field for the SharePoint server results are 
removed from the HTTP response header.  The Content-Location field no longer displays 
the default iisstart.htm value.   
 
Figure 58:  Nessus Service – SNOS – HTTP Response Header 
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SNOS is successful at obfuscating the SMB protocol from Nessus, Figure 59.  
SNOS obfuscates the Native OS, and Native Lan Manager fields, so these fields no 
longer disclose the Windows operating system.  SNOS blocks incoming SMB Null 
session requests, which does not allow Nessus to determine the operating system by 
connecting to a SMB Null session. 
 
Figure 59:  Nessus Service – SNOS – SMB 
The results in Figure 50 through Figure 59, except Figure 53, are summarized in 
Figure 60 and represent the results recorded in the Exchange row.  Figure 53 represents a 
cell in the SharePoint server row under the “No Obfuscation” column.  The complete list 
of results for all forty repetitions is shown in Appendix B.   
 
 
Figure 60:  Nessus Service Experimental Run 
5.3 Network Latency Results 
The Network Latency experiment consists of two trials – the benchmark and the 
SNOS trials.  Appendix C contains the results from all ten experimental runs for the 
Network Latency experiment.  Network latency is measured by using the roundtrip time.  
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Figure 61 shows experimental run #10 taken from Appendix C.  Each experimental run 
produces twelve results per host.  Each trial in the network latency experimental ran for 
one hour collecting the twelve results.  A mean is calculated for the roundtrip time every 
five minutes throughout the hour from the results obtained during that specific five 
minute interval.  This five minute mean is used as a single result – one of the twelve – 
during the one hour trial run.  A five minute average roundtrip time as the result help 
eliminate the variance that a rogue packet can have over the course of the entire 
experiment’s results.  A rogue packet is a packet that for some reason is delayed or lost in 
transit.  Rogue packets can occur because of collisions at the NIC, on the wire, or 
corruption of the packet throughout the transmission process. 
The Mean columns for each trial shown in Figure 61 represent the average 
roundtrip time of the twelve results for each host.  The Min columns represent the 
minimum roundtrip time out of the twelve results for each host.  The Max columns 
represent the maximum roundtrip time out of the twelve results for each host.  The SD 
columns are the standard deviations for each set of twelve results per host and the CI 
columns represent the 95% confidence interval for each host using the twelve results.  
The numbers represented in each cell are recorded in microseconds to more accurately 
detect any differences between the trials.  The network latency analysis, Section 5.5, uses 
the combined results for all ten repetitions to calculate the experimental mean, confidence 
interval, comparison of means, box plots, and ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) tables for 
each host.   
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Figure 61:  Network Latency Result 
5.4 Obfuscation Effectiveness Analysis 
The obfuscation effectiveness experiment yields 1,920 individual results – 40 
experimental runs x 3 trials x 4 fingerprinting tests x 4 hosts.  Figure 62 shows a 
histogram of all 1,920 results separated by trial.  The variance in both the benchmark and 
OSfuscate trials are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.1 and resulted from the Nmap 
Service test against the workstation host.   Appendices D and F list all 1,920 results 
returned throughout the obfuscation effectiveness experiment. 
 
Figure 62:  Nmap and Nessus Obfuscation Results for All Hosts and Tests 
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A more accurate depiction of the effectiveness of OSfuscate and SNOS compared 
with the benchmark trial is viewed when grouping the two tests – OS Class and Service – 
for each fingerprinting program into a combined test result.  The analysis of the results 
from the obfuscation effectiveness experiment are grouped together according to the 
fingerprinting program used – Nmap or Nessus.   
The analysis is grouped together because when either program runs (using the 
parameters discussed in Section 2.4.1 for Nmap and Section 2.4.2 for Nessus) the OS 
Class and Service tests are simultaneously run against the host.  The results are recorded 
separately because each test is critical to determine the effectiveness of the SNOS 
obfuscation process relative to OSfuscate and the benchmark.  The results show that 
OSfuscate focuses on obfuscating the Nmap OS Class test and does not obfuscate the 
remaining tests.  By grouping the two tests for each fingerprinting program together, the 
analysis shows that both tests must be defeated to successfully obfuscate the host’s 
operating system because both tests automatically run and if one test identifies Windows 
then the attacker now has probable cause to believe the target is running Windows.   
Figure 63 represents the histogram for the combined test results for Nmap and 
Nessus against each host per trial.  This histogram shows that thorough obfuscation must 
obfuscate all layers of a network packet.  OSfuscate only focuses on the TCP and IP 
header portions of the packet and does not obfuscate Application layer protocols or other 
transport layer protocols making operating system identification possible.  The SNOS 
program defeats Nmap’s and Nessus’ fingerprinting techniques by obfuscating all layers 
of a network packet.  Figure 63 shows that no variance occurrs within each trial, the 
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benchmark and OSfuscate trials always identify the Windows operating system and the 
SNOS trial never identifies the Windows operating system.   
 
Figure 63:  Combined Test Results for Nmap and Nessus 
5.4.1 Nmap Analysis 
After completing forty repetitions, Nmap produced 320 test results, counting the 
two Nmap tests individually, for each of the three trials – benchmark, OSfuscate, and 
SNOS and all four hosts.  Figure 64 shows the histogram separated by each trial for the 
combined test result.  The OS Class and the Service tests are combined to a single result, 
making 160 results per trial for Nmap.  Combined test results are calculated such that if 
one or both of the tests result in a successful operating system identification than the 
combined result is considered successful.   
Appendix D shows all the results for each Nmap test and the combined result of 
the two tests for each run.  If a Y exists in either the OS Class or Service columns then 
the Combined column contains a Y.  The Combined column highlights the importance of 
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a thorough network packet obfuscation process.  The Combined column from Appendix 
D is represented in Figure 64. 
The combined Nmap test result correctly identifies the host 100% of the time for 
both the benchmark and OSfuscate trials and 0% of the time for the SNOS trial.   Figure 
64 shows that the SNOS program is 100% successful against Nmap fingerprinting 
because Nmap is never able to identify the Windows operating system.  The failure of 
Nmap to identify the correct operating system is a result of the SNOS program running 
during the SNOS trial because the SNOS program is the only variable difference between 
the benchmark and SNOS trials.  The OSfuscate program produces the same results as 
the benchmark; therefore, OSfuscate providesw no additional obfuscation benefits over 
the benchmark trial. 
 
Figure 64:  Combined Test Results for Nmap Operating System Identification 
Figure 64 results are significant because both tests must be defeated to completely 
obfuscate a host’s operating system against Nmap.  Analyzing the results by test – OS 
Class and Service – for the Workstation host provided additional results worth noting, 
even though the combined test result provides the important obfuscation effectiveness 
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result.  The Nmap Service test on the workstation host is the only time out of the 960 
Nmap Service results that variation occurred within a trial’s results.   
Figure 65 shows how both the benchmark and OSfuscate trials produce “No” 
results because the Nmap Service test is not able to detect the SMB (port 445) version 
running on the host.  The Nmap Service test identifies the SMB version on every run in 
the benchmark and OSfuscate trials for the remaining three hosts – Exchange server, 
SharePoint server, and web server.  SMB is the only service running on the workstation 
that would identify the underlying Windows operating system using the Nmap Service 
test.  (The SSH service running on the workstation provides no additional information 
about the underlying operating system because the exact same version of SSH server 
running on the workstation, natively runs in a Linux environment.)   
Fifteen results from the benchmark trial on the workstation host return no version 
information about the SMB protocol (and therefore, no information about the underlying 
operating system).  The OSfuscate trial yields fourteen results in which the SMB version 
is not identified by the Nmap Service test.  SNOS is able to obfuscate the SMB version 
throughout all forty experimental runs for the workstation as seen in Figure 65. 
Possible reasons that the Nmap Service might not occasionally identify the SMB 
version during the benchmark and OSfuscate trials is related to network latency – lost or 
corrupted network packets.  The necessary network packets for the Nmap Service to 
identify the SMB version do not arrive in either a timely manner or a manner consistent 
with what Nmap is expecting.  The Nmap Service test uses a timing delay to identify 
services based on the response from custom packets sent to a host.  Packets received past 
the time allowed are no longer considered part of the fingerprinting process.  The timing 
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delay used for the Nmap Service test expires before the response is received back from 
the workstation host. 
 
Figure 65:  Workstation Host Result from Nmap Service Test 
The variance in the results shown in Figure 65 is not significant because the 
combined test results provide the significant obfuscation analysis.  A successful 
deception process, Section 2.2.1, must be verifiable from multiple sources, meaning that 
each test for Nmap and Nessus must provide effective obfuscation results.  The combined 
test results for the workstation host are always successful at identifying the Windows 
operating system.   
Using the 2x2 contingency table in Table 6, Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) is run from 
the results shown in Figure 65.  The null hypothesis was that OSfuscate is the same as the 
benchmark trial.  Conversely, the alternate hypothesis is that OSfuscate does not equal 
the benchmark.  FET is calculated by using the data in Table 6 with the formula 
following formula: [ (R1!R2! 
… Rm!)(C1!C2! 
… Cn!) ] / [ N! ∏ij aij! ] where R variables 
represent the row totals, C variables represent the Column totals, N variable is the total 
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number of results – the total/total cell in Table 6.   The Fisher’s Exact Test returns 
0.17885 meaning that with a 95% confidence interval, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected because 0.17885 > 0.05.  As expected, the results between the benchmark and 
OSfuscate trials cannot be determined to be different for the workstation from the Nmap 
Service test.  The benchmark trial actually produces more results that do not identify the 
Windows operating system than the OSfuscate trial.  The FET calculation means that no 
significant difference is detected between the benchmark and the OSfuscate trials despite 
the occasional failure of the Nmap Service to identify the SMB version. 
Table 6:  2x2 Contingency Table – Benchmark and OSfuscate - Workstation 
 Benchmark OSfuscate Total 
Not Identified 15 14 29 
Identified 25 26 51 
Total 40 40 80 
 
The Nmap OS Class test’s confidence level is shown in Figure 66.  Nmap’s 
confidence level represents how confident Nmap is in matching the results to a known 
operating system fingerprint in Nmap’s database.  Figure 66 represents the results for all 
fours hosts combined (forty results per host) and shows that OSfuscate does affect 
Nmap’s confidence level.  A specific confidence level range is not considered significant 
because additional research would need to determine at which confidence level 
percentage an average user no longer trusts the result.  If the host’s operating system is 
103 
 
correctly identified by the test, no matter the confidence level, the test is considered 
successful in identifying the Windows operating system.   
Ultimately the Nmap OS class test, running OSfuscate, identifies the host 
operating system 100% of the time.  (Windows is almost always identified with the 
highest confidence level and always greater than an 88% confidence level).  Nmap has a 
0% confidence level in identify Windows during the SNOS trial because Nmap OS Class 
never identifies the Windows operating system.   
 
Figure 66:  Nmap OS Class Confidence Level of Accuracy for Windows Operating  
System Fingerprinting 
Appendix E contains the list of histograms for the combined Nmap tests’ results 
for each host – Exchange, SharePoint, web, and workstation.  The histograms show a 
visual difference between the SNOS trial’s and the other two trials’ results.  The only 
difference between each trial is the obfuscation program running on the host – the 
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program running, and the SNOS trial has the SNOS program running; therefore, any 
statistically significant difference between the results can be attributed to the obfuscation 
program running. 
Table 7 is the 2x2 Contingency Table for the Combined test results between the 
benchmark and SNOS trials and shows the data used to calculate Fisher’s Exact Test for 
each host individually per fingerprinting program.  Each fingerprinting program produces 
identical combined test results shown in Appendices D and F.   
Table 7 represents the 2x2 Contingency Table for either Nmap’s and Nessus’ 
results because the combined test results are identical and represents all four hosts 
because the combined test results for each host are identical.  Using the Fisher’s Exact 
Test formula, the resulting p-value is 2.75168E-21 – an extremely small number.  This p-
value is significant which means the null hypothesis – that the trials are equal – can be 
rejected and the alternate hypothesis that the trials are different can be accepted.   
The FET calculation shows the statistical significance between the results of the 
SNOS trial and the benchmark trial.  This calculation confirms that the SNOS program 
causes the difference in the results for each of the four hosts.  This experiment emulates a 
production environment but is not a randomly chosen configuration setup out of all 
possible configurations for each service and host.  The scope of interference is limited to 
the configurations used during this experiment.   
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Table 7:  2x2 Contingency Table – Benchmark & SNOS – Combined Test Results 
 None SNOS Total 
Not Detected 0 40 40 
Detected 40 0 40 
Total 40 40 80 
5.4.2 Nessus Analysis 
The combined test results for both Nessus tests – OS Class and Service – are 
shown in Appendix F.  Nessus yields 960 results, 320 per trial, between both the OS 
Class and Service tests.  The only recorded difference between the results of Nessus and 
Nmap is that the Nessus Service test is able to correctly identify the version of all tested 
services on each host every time, and subsequently identify the underlying operating 
system 100% of the time, for the baseline and OSfuscate trials.  The Nmap Service test 
occasionally fails to identify the service version for the baseline and OSfuscate trials as 
previously discussed in Section 5.4.2 for the workstation host. 
Figure 67 is a histogram representing the combined test results for each trial with 
Nessus.  The results within each trial, like Nmap, provide no variance.  Nessus correctly 
fingerprints the Windows operating system during the baseline and OSfuscate trials.  
Nessus does not fingerprint the Windows operating system during the SNOS trial.  The 
lack of variance within each trial’s results provides a clear picture of the effectiveness of 
each trial in defeating Nessus.   Appendix G contains the histograms of the Nessus 
combined test results for each host.   
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Table 7 also represents the 2x2 contingency table for the Nessus combined test 
results for each host.  This 2x2 contingency table produces a p-outcome value by using 
Fisher’s Exact Test algorithm.  The p-value is the same as Nmap’s combined test’s p-
value because the results are identical and is 2.75168E-21 which is significantly smaller 
than the statistically significant p-value of .01.  The small p-value means that a 
statistically significant difference exists between the SNOS and baseline trials.  The FET 
result statistically proves that the SNOS program causes the difference between the two 
trials because the SNOS program is the only changed variable between each trial.   
 
Figure 67:  Combined Test Results for Nessus’ Operating System Identification per Trial 
The previous histograms show that SNOS is effective in defeating Nmap and 
Nessus.  The experiment was repeated forty times.  After the initial twenty runs, no 
variance was detected in the combined test results.  An additional twenty runs were 
performed to increase the combined test results from twenty to forty for each host to 
provide a larger result set to analyze.   
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If after forty runs, the variance was still highly volatile, meaning the standard 
deviation for each trial was not converging on a particular number then the experiment 
would have been repeated until the variance and standard deviation converged towards a 
specific number – meaning the variance was no longer volatile.  Forty repetitions were 
sufficient because each trial’s variance was not volatile – providing no variance within 
each trial for the combined test results.  Forty repetitions were sufficient to determine the 
significance of the results of the obfuscation effectiveness experiment as shown by the 
histograms and proven by the Fisher’s Exact Test calculations. 
5.4.3 Combined Obfuscation Analysis 
OSfuscate does not obfuscate the host operating system during the experiment 
because OSfuscate is created to only defeat the TCP/IP scanning method of fingerprinting 
by changing Windows registry values.  Both Nmap and Nessus use several techniques to 
fingerprint a host’s operating system – more than just TCP/IP fingerprinting.  
As discussed in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, the results from the obfuscation 
effectiveness experiment for the SNOS trial always obfuscates the Windows operating 
system.  SNOS achieves a 100% obfuscation success rate is because of the finite set of 
methods used to identify the host’s operating system.  Considerable time was spent 
identifying and confirming the various fingerprinting methods.  Once these methods and 
differences were identified, SNOS was written to effectively obfuscate the protocols to 
counter the techniques used by Nmap and Nessus.  SNOS is developed to allow future 
additional protocols to be obfuscated by SNOS as needed.  
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5.5 Network Latency Analysis 
The network latency experiment consists of two trials – the baseline and SNOS.  
The network latency experiment is repeated ten times and yields 960 individual results – 
480 results for the baseline trial and 480 results for the SNOS trial.  Each host has 120 
individual results per trial.  The analysis of the network latency experiment is divided by 
host in the following subsections.  The generated network load for each trial over the 
course of each experimental run is identical by using Tcpreplay.  The network latency is 
recorded in microseconds.   
The sample network traffic represents specific traffic for each host from an entire 
day’s network load.  The network traffic originates from the Cyber Defense Exercise 
(CDX) 2010 traffic at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  Obtaining a random sample 
from all possible network loads is not feasible; therefore, the results and analysis do not 
apply to all possible network loads.  Even if a random sample is taken from the samples 
available, inference to the general population of all possible configurations could still not 
be made.  The complete samples available do not represent a random sample from all 
possible hosts and configurations currently employed throughout the world for the 
selected protocols and services.  The following analysis is constrained with these 
conditions.   
Virtualization and Tcpreplay allow each trial and each repetition to be identical.  
Causalities can be inferred regarding the effect the SNOS program has on network 
latency for each host in reference to the scope of inference noted.   
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5.5.1 Exchange Host Analysis 
Figure 68 shows all 120 individual results for the Exchange host during the 
baseline trial, and Figure 69 shows the SNOS trial results.  The dots in each figure 
represent the individual results for each trial.  The black lines show the mean from all 120 
results for each trial.     
 
Figure 68:  Network Latency – Exchange – Benchmark 
 
 
Figure 69:  Network Latency – Exchange - SNOS 
Figure 70 shows the confidence intervals and means as a comparison of means.  
The mean for the benchmark trial is 231.92 microseconds and the mean for the SNOS 
trial is 236.15 microseconds.  The benchmark has a tighter 95% confidence interval with 
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only a +/- 4.7 microseconds range from the mean, Figure 70.  The SNOS trial’s 95% 
confidence interval is 5.66 microseconds +/- range from the mean.  The confidence 
interval, +/- 4.7 or +/- 5.6, is added to each respective mean to graph the rectangles in 
Figure 70.  The number outside the upper corner of the rectangle represents the upper 
range of the confidence interval and the number outside the lower corner represents the 
lower range of the confidence interval. 
The mean for the benchmark trial is barely within the 95% confidence interval 
range for the SNOS trial and vice versa.  Since the means fall within each other’s 
confidence intervals, the trials’ results cannot be considered different.   
 
Figure 70:  95% Confidence Interval – Exchange 
The t-Test calculation, Table 8, confirms the Comparison of Means that at the 
95% confidence level no significant difference exists between each trial’s results. 
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Table 8:  Exchange Server t-Test 
 
Benchmark SNOS 
  227.4066667 231.6533333 
Mean 231.9620168 236.1862465 
Variance 695.4812955 1010.461557 
Observations 120 120 
Pearson Correlation 0.243925237 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 119 
 t Stat -1.279544022 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.101607858 
 t Critical one-tail 1.657869523 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.203215716 
 t Critical two-tail 1.980272226   
 
The box plot, shown in Figure 71, shows the variation of the results within each 
trial and which trial had a larger spread.  The stars indicate the largest maximum outlier, 
if any, in the results.  The triangles represent the smallest minimum outlier.  In the box 
plot, only the maximum and minimum outliers are shown.  50% of the results fall within 
the box for each trial.  The middle line is the median for each trial and means that 50% of 
all results for a trial fall above and 50% fall below the line.   
Table 9 is the Exchange data that is used to create Figure 71 and shows the 
number of outliers for each.  The IQR (interquartile range) row in Table 9 shows that 
SNOS has more variance, 19.5, than the benchmark trial, 14.5.  The spread is shown 
graphically in Figure 71 by the thickness of each box plot; SNOS has a thicker box plot. 
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Figure 71:  Box Plot of Exchange Results 
 
Table 9:  Box Plot Data - Exchange 
None SNOS 
Min 186.00 182.00 
Q1 221 220.5333333 
Median 227.4966667 228.035 
Q3 235.51 240 
Max 407 376.2933333 
IQR 14.51 19.46666667 
Upper Outliers 9 12 
Lower Outliers 3 1 
 
 Table 10 is the ANOVA, Analysis of Variance, between the benchmark and 
SNOS trials.  The ANOVA is an analysis of the variance by comparing the means.  The 
analysis uses a 95% confidence interval.  The null hypothesis is that no difference exists 
between the benchmark and SNOS trials.  The summary section, in Table 10, is a 
summary of the results per trial:  “Count” is the number of results, “Sum” is the 
summation of all the results per trial, “Average” is the mean, and “Variance” is the 
variance per trial.   
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The ANOVA portion of Table 10 shows the statistical information from the F-test 
and ANOVA.  The df represents the degrees of freedom, which is one less than the 
number of groups, 2 – 1.  The SS column represents the sum of squares between groups 
and within groups.  The F crit value was calculated using the degrees of freedom.  The F 
value is calculated by squaring the t-statistic. (The t statistic is squared because the F-test 
is a one sided test).  Microsoft Excel calculated the exact F value.  The F value can also 
be looked up in a t value table.  Using an F-Distribution lookup table with α = 0.05, the F 
crit value = 3.88 by looking in the table when v1 = 1 (degrees of freedom between the 
groups) and v2 = 238 (degrees of freedom within the groups).  The exact F crit value 
calculated by Excel is shown in Table 10.  α is selected to be 0.05 meaning that the 
results are significant at a 5% significance level.   
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected because F crit is greater than F value in 
Table 10.  The p-value represents how likely the difference between the two means 
occurrs by chance.  The lower the p-value the less likely the difference is a result of 
chance.  The large p-value, 0.26171, means that the results could have occurred by 
chance.  A p-value less than the significance level is interpreted to mean the difference is 
unlikely to have occurred by chance.  The ANOVA result implies the two trials’ means 
cannot not be considered equal because the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  The 
ANOVA analysis indicates that the trials’ means can be equal but also that the results 
could have occurred by chance since the p-value was not significantly low.  Further 
analysis is discussed in Section 5.5.5 about the combined network latency analysis for the 
results of all the hosts together.   
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Table 10:  Exchange ANOVA and F-Test Analysis 
SUMMARY 
      Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
  None 120 27830.88667 231.9240556 689.8098417 
  SNOS 120 28337.81667 236.1484722 1002.141511 
  
       ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 1070.741771 1 1070.741771 1.26568 0.26171 3.88082 
Within 
Groups 201342.211 238 845.9756763 
   Total 202412.9527 239         
 
5.5.2 SharePoint Host Analysis 
The results for each trial are shown in Figure 72 and 73, respectively.  Each 
represents a result.  Several outliers in the benchmark trial are extreme – over 1000 
microseconds.  These outliers dramatically influence the analytical results for the 
benchmark trial.  These extreme outliers for the benchmark trial shift the mean and 
confidence interval.  These benchmark outliers are shown in Figure 72 by the dots that 
took over 1000 microseconds to return. 
 
Figure 72:   Network Latency – SharePoint - Benchmark 
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Figure 73:  Network Latency – SharePoint - SNOS 
The mean for the benchmark trial is 362.32.  The mean for the SNOS trial is 
305.65.  The SharePoint host’s results yield a better mean time with the SNOS program 
running than the benchmark without the SNOS program.  The SNOS trial inspects each 
incoming and outgoing packet by an additional program.  An additional step to receive 
and send network traffic should produce a higher mean time not a lower one.  Figure 74 
shows a large confidence interval range for the benchmark trial compared to the SNOS 
trial for the SharePoint server.  Using the comparison of means, the benchmark’s mean 
does not fall within the SNOS trial’s confidence interval.   
 
Figure 74:  95% Confidence Interval – SharePoint 
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The extreme outliers in the benchmark trial drastically affect the analysis of the 
benchmark results by skewing the data, as shown with the large confidence interval in 
Figure 74.  By removing the outliers, the results produce statistically significant 
differences between the two trials, shown in Figure 75.  Without the outliers, the 
benchmark trial is significantly different than the SNOS trial because neither mean falls 
within the other’s confidence interval.  This comparison of means provides statistical 
evidence for a difference between the two trials in network latency when the extreme 
outliers are removed.   
Removing the outliers improves the statistical analysis of the results but can 
possibly throw out valid data.  If the outliers that are removed are a result of network 
problems not related to the actual trial then the removal can be warranted.  For instance, 
if a NIC is experiencing problems and results in the outliers than removing the outliers 
could make statistical sense without damaging the integrity of the results.  This scenario 
is unlikely because extreme outliers happen over the course of several repetitions during 
the benchmark trial and never during the SNOS trial.  The outliers could have resulted 
because of normal network latency based on the specific packets requested from the 
SharePoint server.  These packets might not have affected the SNOS trial because the 
SNOS program could have altered the packets such that the operating system’s 
performance was enhanced.   
SNOS is programmed to drop specific types of incoming request packets.  A large 
number of these packets would require a large number of responses from the SharePoint 
server.  The benchmark trial would create these responses while the SNOS trial would 
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drop the request packet and the Windows operating system and underlying application 
would not create a response packet.   
The extreme outliers during the benchmark trial happened when the SharePoint 
server received several SMB Null Session requests and subsequent SMB queries trying to 
use the Null Session connection.  Several of these SMB queries were queries for objects 
that did not exist on the SharePoint server.  During the benchmark trial, the SharePoint 
server spent time processing and executing these SMB queries which accounted for the 
extreme outliers.  These Null Session requests attempted to access the sysvol and IPC$ 
default shared directories and attempted to query inside Window policy files and objects.  
Most of the policy objects and files did not exist within the SharePoint server meaning 
that during the benchmark trial these requests took additional time as Windows queried 
and searched for these objects.  These incoming requests come from the traffic taken 
from the Cyber Defense Exercise of 2010 and were used to try and gain access into the 
hosts during that exercise.  SNOS effectively dropped the original SMB Null Session 
request and queries which eliminated the Windows processing time searching for the 
invalid objects queried.   
Looking at Figure 72, the extreme outliers are significantly above the otherwise 
almost flat line response from the remaining results.  Four out of ten repetitions produce 
extreme outliers.   
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Figure 75:  95% Confidence Interval – SharePoint without Outliers 
Ignoring the validity of the outliers, Figure 75 provides conclusive evidence that a 
difference exists between the network latency of the two trials; however, as previously 
stated, the extreme outliers during the benchmark trial are a result of SBM Null Session 
packets that queried invalid objects on the SharePoint server. 
The box plot, Figure 76, shows a comparison between the spread of the two trials’ 
results.  Table 11 shows the data used for the box plot and the number of maximum and 
minimum outliers for each trial.  The box plot includes all results, even extreme outliers, 
for each trial.  The IQR (interquartile range) value in Table 11 shows that the SNOS trial 
has more variance, 25, than the benchmark trial, 19.  The benchmark has less spread even 
though the benchmark trial has several extreme outliers that skewed the mean and 
confidence intervals.  The box plot and its data provide an unbiased view, irrespective of 
outliers, about the results between each trial.  This data shows that most of the time, on an 
individual result basis, SNOS increases the network latency.  Over 75% of SNOS’ results 
have more network latency than 75% of the benchmark results.  Figure 76 does not show 
the maximum outlier for the benchmark trial because the maximum outlier, 4164.58, lies 
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off the graph and the graph is narrowed down to more clearly depict the difference 
between the box plots of the two trials. 
 
Figure 76:  Box Plot for SharePoint Results 
 
Table 11:  Box Plot Data - SharePoint 
None SNOS 
Min 224.00 267.00 
Q1 258 290.47 
Median 264.59 300 
Q3 277 316.4241667 
Max 4164.58 399 
IQR 19 25.95416667 
Upper Outliers 17 6 
Lower Outliers 1 0 
 
Table 12 shows the ANOVA table for the SharePoint results which analyzes the 
significance of the results.  The null hypothesis is that no difference in network latency 
exists between the benchmark and SNOS trials.  The results of the F-Distribution values, 
F and F crit, mean that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected – the benchmark and SNOS 
trials cannot not be considered equal.  The significance level for the SharePoint ANOVA 
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test is 0.05, α = 0.05.  The p-value of 0.16627 is high which means the difference could 
have occurred by chance and could not be determined to be statistically significant.  The 
inconclusive ANOVA result is because of the extremely high outliers during the 
benchmark trial.  The benchmark trial yields six results that are over 1000 microseconds 
and about three times larger than the median and 75% of all the remaining results.  These 
five results create a long-tailed distribution which inherently causes problems with 
ANOVA. 
Table 12:  SharePoint ANOVA and F-Test Analysis 
SUMMARY 
      Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
  None 120 43478.59 362.3215833 199347.2767 
  SNOS 120 36677.47667 305.6456389 582.0027408 
  
       ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 192729.7607 1 192729.7607 1.92797 0.16627 3.88082 
Within 
Groups 23791584.25 238 99964.6397 
   Total 23984314.01 239      
5.5.3 Web Host Analysis 
The web server host produces 120 results per trial.  The results for the benchmark 
and SNOS trials are shown in Figure 77 and 78, respectively.  The SNOS trial produces 
more extreme outliers than the benchmark trial.  The SNOS outliers are not significant to 
skew the data similar to the SharePoint benchmark results.   
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Figure 77:  Network Latency – Web - Benchmark 
 
 
Figure 78:  Network Latency – Web - SNOS 
The mean for the benchmark trial is 268.16 and 321.33 for the SNOS trial.  The 
95% confidence interval for the benchmark does not reach the lower range of the 95% 
confidence interval for the SNOS trial as shown in Figure 79.  The comparison of means 
between the two trials is significant such that the SNOS trial can be attributed to being 
different than the benchmark trial.  Since the network latency difference is significant 
because the means do not overlap with each other’s confidence interval, the SNOS 
268.16
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
m
ic
ro
se
co
n
d
s
Sample Points 
(total of 120)
Web - Benchmark
Web - None
Mean
321.33
250
450
650
850
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
m
ic
ro
se
co
n
d
s
Sample Points 
(total of 120)
Web - SNOS
Web - SNOS
122 
 
program can be said to have caused the network latency because the only difference 
between the benchmark trial and the SNOS trial is that the SNOS trial has the SNOS 
program running.   
 
Figure 79:  95% Confidence Interval – Web 
The t-Test for the web server, Table 13, further shows the statistical significance 
between the differences of each trial’s results.  The p-value is extremely small and shows 
significance even at a 99% confidence level.   
Table 13:  Web Server t-Test 
 
Benchmark SNOS 
  256.0533333 319.79 
Mean 268.2651261 321.3422969 
Variance 659.012835 9540.194619 
Observations 120 120 
Pearson Correlation -0.183323888 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 119 
 t Stat -5.491073838 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 1.16381E-07 
 t Critical one-tail 1.657869523 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 2.32762E-07 
 t Critical two-tail 1.980272226   
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The box plot in Figure 80 shows the spread of the results within each trial.  The 
median value, 262 microseconds, for the benchmark trial is smaller than the SNOS 
median, 295 microseconds, meaning that 50% of the results from the SNOS trial produce 
higher latency times compared with the benchmark trial.  The third quartile for the 
benchmark trial in Table 14 means that 75% of all results have less latency time than 
75% of the SNOS trial results.  This data is used to produce Figure 80 and indicates that 
the benchmark trial has fewer, 12, maximum outliers than the SNOS trial, 15.  Neither 
trial yields minimum outliers.  An outlier is a result outside either the upper whisker or 
the lower whisker for each box plot.  Figure 80 does not show the SNOS maximum 
outlier, 949 microseconds, as the graph is only showing results up to 450 microseconds in 
order to more clearly see the difference between the box plots of the two trials.   
 
Figure 80:  Box Plot for Web Results 
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Table 14:  Box Plot Data - Web 
None SNOS 
Min 232.75 273.00 
Q1 253.75 287 
Median 262 295 
Q3 273.1733333 308.25 
Max 410 949 
IQR 19.42333333 21.25 
Upper Outliers 12 15 
Lower Outliers 0 0 
 
The ANOVA result, Table 15, shows the statistical significance of the results.  
The F value is greater than the F-crit value meaning the null hypothesis can be rejected 
and the alternate hypothesis, that the trials are different, is accepted.  The p-value 
identified is extremely low, 0.00000002998 and indicates that the results are unlikely to 
have occurred by chance.  The ANOVA calculations mean that the SNOS program 
causes network latency and that the results are highly unlikely to have occurred by 
chance.   
Table 15:  Web ANOVA and F-Test Analysis 
SUMMARY 
      Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
  256.0533333 119 31924 268.2651261 659.0128 
  319.79 119 38240 321.3422969 9540.194 
  
       ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 167622.571 1 167622.571 32.86972 0.000000029980 3.881163 
Within 
Groups 1203506.48 236 5099.603727 
   Total 1371129.051 237         
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5.5.4 Workstation Host Analysis 
Figure 81 and 82 show the results for the benchmark and SNOS trials.  Figure 81 
shows that the benchmark trial produces more extreme outliers than the SNOS trial.  
These outliers, unlike the SharePoint benchmark results, are not extreme enough to skew 
the analysis of the data. 
 
Figure 81:  Network Latency – Workstation – Benchmark 
 
 
Figure 82:  Network Latency – Workstation - SNOS 
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The benchmark trial’s mean is 289.99 microseconds which is less than the 
SNOS’s trial mean of 358.3 microseconds.  The upper 95% confidence interval line, 
269.4 microseconds, for the benchmark trial does not fall within the 95% confidence 
interval of the SNOS trial.  Figure 83 visually shows the comparison of means which 
provides conclusive evidence that the benchmark trial and SNOS trial results are 
statistically significant.  The SNOS trial produces greater network latency on the 
network, shown in Figure 83, proven by the comparison of the means.  Neither mean falls 
within the other’s 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 83:  95% Confidence Interval – Workstation 
The Comparison of Means analysis is validated by the t-Test for the workstation 
host shown in Table 16.  The extremely small p-value means that even at a 99% 
confidence interval the results between each trial would be significantly different. 
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Table 16:  Workstation t-Test 
 
Benchmark SNOS 
  272.5466667 358.9833333 
Mean 290.1320448 358.289916 
Variance 13344.45857 672.0435035 
Observations 120 120 
Pearson Correlation 0.502397646 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 119 
 t Stat -7.086727531 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 5.40025E-11 
 t Critical one-tail 1.657869523 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.08005E-10 
 t Critical two-tail 1.980272226   
 
The box plot, Figure 84, differentiates between the variance of the two trials.  The 
box plot provides a visual difference between the two trials’ results and shows that 
neither the median nor 75% of the data – all results less than or equal to 277 
microseconds – are within the interquartile of the SNOS trial.  This box plot comparison 
shows that over 75% of all the results for the benchmark trial has less network latency 
than 75% of all the SNOS trial results.   
Table 17 contains the data used to create Figure 84 and identifies eleven 
maximum outliers, none of which are shown in Figure 84 because the axis range is 
narrowed down to more clearly show the box plots.  The SNOS trial’s minimum outlier, 
277 microseconds, is the only result that fell within the interquartile range of the 
benchmark trial.   
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Figure 84:  Box Plot for Workstation Results 
 
Table 17:  Box Plot Data - Workstation 
None SNOS 
Min 241.00 277.00 
Q1 259.8466667 346 
Median 268.6266667 354 
Q3 277 363 
Max 1180 483 
IQR 17.15333333 17 
Upper Outliers 11 8 
Lower Outliers 0 1 
 
The ANOVA and F-Test are shown in Table 18.  The null hypothesis, that the 
means between the two trials are equal, can be rejected in favor of the alternate 
hypothesis that a difference exists between the means.  The F value is greater than the F 
crit value which allows the null hypothesis to be rejected.  The p-value, 0.000000001101, 
is statistically significant.  The small p-value means that the results are highly unlikely to 
have occurred by chance.  The F values allow the causation – the SNOS program causes 
network latency – to be accepted and the p-value means that the results are not by chance. 
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Table 18:  Workstation ANOVA and F-Test Analysis 
SUMMARY 
      Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
  None 120 34798 289.9855 13234.89731 
  SNOS 120 42995 358.2956944 666.400086 
  
       ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 279976.9599 1 279976.9599 40.28069495 0.000000001101 3.880827 
Within 
Groups 1654254.39 238 6950.648698 
   Total 1934231.35 239         
 
5.5.5 Combined Host Analysis 
The four hosts produce varying results regarding the affect the SNOS program has 
on network latency.  The Exchange server results are not necessarily unexpected but 
simply do not produce conclusive statistical analytical.  For the Exchange server SNOS 
does not cause statistically significant network latency.   
Figure 85 and 86 show the combined plots of all four hosts for the two trials – 
benchmark and SNOS.  The first 120 results plotted in each figure represent the 120 
results from the Exchange server, the next 120 the SharePoint server, and so on.  These 
figures and further analysis of the combined hosts’ results introduce additional variables 
beyond the statistical relevance of the results.  An additional factor is the different 
network loads that are custom generated according to each host.   
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Figure 85:  Combined Host Results - Benchmark 
 
 
Figure 86:  Combined Host Results – SNOS 
The spread and variation within each trial for all the hosts combined is visually 
evident in Figure 87 because the SNOS trial’s box plot is fatter meaning that the SNOS 
trial produces greater variance between results than the benchmark trial.  Since the 
network load differed between each host, the results do not correlate to any usable 
statistical information.  An ANOVA table is not provided to distract from the statistical 
relevance already determined by comparing the results individually for each host in the 
previous sections. 
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Figure 87:  Box Plot – Combined Host Results 
5.6 Additional Benefits of SNOS 
To defeat the fingerprinting techniques employed by Nmap and Nessus, SNOS 
blocks incoming ICMP timestamp requests and SMB Null Session requests.  A Windows 
operating system uses little endian format and so the ICMP timestamp response generated 
by Windows is in little endian format.  Nessus sometimes accurately identifies the 
Windows host by determining if the most significant bit is set in the timestamp reply – 
indicating the little endian format.  By blocking ICMP timestamp requests, SNOS 
prevents a remote user from identifying the date and time of the host which are 
sometimes used to help coordinate further attacks against the host.   
By responding to an SMB Null Session request, the host inherently identifies 
itself as a Windows operating system.  The SMB Null Session can also be used to 
enumerate usernames on the host.  Usernames identify the host operating system because 
Windows uses predefined usernames.  By blocking all SMB Null Session requests, SNOS 
does not allow a remote user to enumerate the usernames of the host.   
Blocking SMB Null Sessions can help block worm propagation throughout the 
network.  Worms sometimes use SMB to attack file shares using Null Sessions [Geb04].  
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Blocking Null Sessions on each host, by running SNOS, can block the propagation of 
worms that use SMB Null Sessions to infect new hosts. 
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VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
A potential attacker spends a significant amount of time researching a target.  By 
identifying the operating system running on a host, the attacker can determine possible 
vulnerabilities and methods of exploitation against that host. Most existing obfuscation 
research and programs focus on the Linux operating system.  One of the few Windows-
based obfuscation programs, OSfuscate, only focuses on defeating TCP/IP fingerprinting.  
All the current obfuscation programs modify a very small, finite, set of protocols.  By 
only obfuscating one or two protocols, these programs do not effectively obfuscate the 
operating system of the host.  A complete obfuscation process must occur in order to 
effectively defeat the wide range of fingerprinting techniques currently deployed.   
The Systemic Network Obfuscation System (SNOS) obfuscates the Windows 
operating system.  SNOS does not focus solely on the TCP and IP protocols but 
obfuscates protocols ranging from the Data Link layer to the Application layer in the OSI 
model.  SNOS adheres to the principle that if the program does not obfuscate consistently 
and from all directions (in this case all layers of the OSI model) then the attacker would 
not be fooled.  Obfuscation must be a process potentially involving all protocols within a 
network packet from a host.   
The evaluation of the System Network Obfuscation System uses two metrics – the 
first to determine the obfuscation effectiveness of SNOS compared to OSfuscate and the 
benchmark, and the second to determine the network latency created by running SNOS 
on the host.  Four host configurations are used to test the variance of each 
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protocol/service running based on the most common protocols found on a network and 
protocols identified as being used to fingerprint the underlying operating system of the 
host.  The application serving up a particular protocol on a host is selected based on the 
most common Windows-based applications for each protocol.  In the case of the HTTP 
web server, the top two most used applications are tested against – Apache and Microsoft 
IIS.   
The network latency experiment uses the roundtrip time to determine the latency 
differences between the benchmark and SNOS trials.  The Tcpreplay program injects 
identical network traffic to a host during both trials to eliminate the network traffic load 
as a possible cause of variance between the results.   
The obfuscation effectiveness experiment produces 1,920 results and network 
latency experiment yields 960 results.  The results of the obfuscation experiment are 
grouped according to the specific test and host.  Each of the four hosts has a total of four 
fingerprinting tests run against it for each trial.  The four tests result from two popular 
fingerprinting programs – Nmap and Nessus – and the results are separated according to 
the fingerprinting program and then subdivided according the test – OS Class or Service 
within each fingerprinting program.   
The Systemic Network Obfuscation System obfuscates the underlying host’s 
operating system 100% of the time against each test for each host.  This success rate is 
achievable because of the finite amount of fingerprinting techniques which allowed the 
SNOS program to be created to defeat each identified technique.  The benchmark, as 
expected, yields a 100% failure rate, meaning that each fingerprinting program is able to 
correctly identify the host’s operating system as Windows.  Fisher’s Exact Test’s 
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calculations and histogram figures show the obfuscation effectiveness of SNOS 
compared to the benchmark and OSfuscate.  Out of the three trials, SNOS is the only 
trial, and therefore program, able defeat all the fingerprinting techniques used by Nmap 
and Nessus.   
The results and analysis of the network latency experiment show that the SNOS 
trial produces greater variance, spread, within its results.  With two of the hosts – web 
and workstation, the SNOS trial causes additional network latency as shown through the 
comparison of means, ANOVA and F-Test results.  The remaining two hosts – Exchange 
and SharePoint produce mixed analytical results and do not provide a conclusive analysis 
regarding the cause of any additional network latency.  So while SNOS accurately 
obfuscates the network packets for the host configurations used in these experiments, 
SNOS has mixed results whether or not the SNOS program causes additional statistically 
significant network latency for each host individually.   
6.2 Host-Based Obfuscation Benefits 
Obfuscation can provide another layer of defense for a host but should not be 
considered the primary security feature.  Operating system service packs and application 
patches should be a top priority in securing a network along with an intrusion detection 
system and firewall that can block and detect anomalies.  Host-based obfuscation should 
not be considered a replacement for network security devices but be considered a defense 
in depth mechanism.   
By obfuscating host information, an attacker might spend additional time and 
resources trying to identify the host.   As a result of this increased time, the attacker 
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might move on to another target or allow the fingerprinting attempts to be detected by 
increasing the amount of time and packets required to fingerprint a host [Rep08].    If host 
obfuscation is used throughout a LAN, either through a network-based obfuscator or 
having a similarly configured obfuscation program running on each host, each host will 
become anonymous among a group of anonymous other hosts [LiT08].  Revealing the 
host-level information makes an exploit easier and faster to use against a target host 
[Ber03].  Despite some claims, ‘security-by-obscurity’ methods can help thwart 
automated attacks [Sha04].  Most payloads delivered and executed through an exploit are 
operating system dependent, meaning a Windows exploit will not work for a Linux 
operating system.  Once an operating system has been correctly identified default exploit 
attempts can be tried, including password guessing using default operating system 
specific administrative usernames.    
Host obfuscation can limit the effectiveness of evasion attacks.  An obfuscation 
technique that changes the TCP/IP stack implementation might affect the way the host re-
orders fragmented packets.  These changes to the TCP/IP stack can block evasion attacks 
aimed at traffic fragmentation [WSM04].  Obfuscation can be considered a security 
feature by providing additional defense in depth in an attempt to make host-level 
fingerprinting harder and less accurate. 
6.3 Future Research 
Systemic Network Obfuscation System obfuscatse IPv4 network packets.  IPv6 is 
continuing to replace IPv4 as the need for additional Internet Protocol addresses increases 
throughout the world.  Additional work improving SNOS should focus on implementing 
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IPv6 obfuscation.  Implementing IPv6 should be fairly simple because only the IP header 
section of the SNOS program needs to be updated to detect and obfuscate IPv6 packets.   
Along with IPv6, additional protocols, specifically at the application layer, could 
be included with SNOS for obfuscation.  Although SNOS currently obfuscates the most 
common protocols found on a network, Windows operating systems enable a wide range 
of protocols by default including Remote Procedure Call (RPC), port map listening (port 
135), and Active Directory related protocols and services.  Recommended future work 
would be to increase the number of protocols SNOS is able to obfuscate.   
SNOS runs as a user-level program instead of a kernel-level program.  User-level 
programs are slower and more resource intensive than kernel-level programs.  Additional 
research could be used to reprogram key components of how SNOS intercepts the traffic 
using the Winpkfilter driver in order to allow SNOS to run as a kernel-level program.  By 
creating SNOS to run as a kernel-level program, the network latency caused by SNOS 
can be shortened because SNOS will not have to jump between user-level and kernel-
level space to obfuscate the network traffic. 
The Systemic Network Obfuscation System results in network packets that have 
identical protocol header field values between different hosts for the same protocols.  In a 
sense, SNOS does traffic normalization indirectly because of the modifications SNOS 
makes to the various protocols.  The custom, partially normalized network packets 
resulting from SNOS could be used to more accurately tune an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) or an intrusion prevention system (IPS).  Additional research should focus on 
integrating SNOS-modified packets with an IDS and IPS devices. 
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An IPS, IDS, or even a firewall can be configured to flag or block packets that 
vary from the SNOS modified packets for each protocol.  This process can be used to 
help detect and remove covert channels because the convert channel program alters a 
small portion of a packet.  Rogue hosts, devices that are not supposed to be allowed on a 
particular network, can also be detected by comparing packets from a host to what the 
packet should look like after the SNOS modifications.  Any difference between a SNOS 
modified packet and a captured packet from a host means that the host is not running 
SNOS and ideally all Windows devices on a particular network will utilize SNOS.   
SNOS can also be extended to integrate a virtual TCP/IP stack implementation.  
Virtual TCP/IP stacks allow each service on a host to be running on a different host.  
SNOS can implement this feature by extending SNOS to assign specific MAC address 
and IP address combinations to a specific application running on the host, creating 
additional MAC and IP addresses as needed.  SNOS would need to keep track of the 
MAC and IP address combinations and the application each combination matches within 
a database or lookup table.  IP/Port hopping methods could also be employed as a part of 
this additional virtual TCP/IP functionality to create a dynamically changing view of the 
entire network infrastructure.   
SNOS can be extended to work as a network-based obfuscation tool by setting up 
the Windows host to act as the default gateway for a network.  If the Windows computer 
that SNOS is installed on is used as the network router then SNOS can be used to 
obfuscate all the packets entering and leaving a network as well. 
SNOS can be combined and tested with other current obfuscation programs and 
techniques.  IPSec modifies the packet information, typically all packet protocols above 
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the Transport layer in the TCP/IP model.  IPSec encrypts the upper layer header fields 
and payload so that the packet data appears as random indistinguishable data.  IPSec can 
allow only specific computers to communicate between each other on specific protocols 
by encrypting the traffic between each so that only the allowed computer can decrypt the 
packet.  SNOS integration with IPSec would limit the protocols detected running on a 
host by making open ports that use IPSec to appear closed. 
Additional work can combine IPsec and SNOS.  SNOS can be modified to work 
in conjunction with the IPSec policies on each device, allowing SNOS to use the IPSec 
policies to determine which devices are allowed access to the host.  SNOS can block each 
packet by simply ignoring/dropping requests sent to a host or by crafting custom response 
packets back to the original non-authorized host.  Implementing IPSec within SNOS 
would allow for quick obfuscation of upper layer protocols and would be particularly 
beneficial for the communication between Active Directory domain controllers and/or 
Exchange servers.  This obfuscation would limit the viewable ports and services available 
for an IPSec-SNOS host by all hosts except ones explicitly allowed through IPSec.   
SNOS is the first obfuscation program to attempt to obfuscate all of the OSI layer 
protocols that make up a network packet.  The results of the obfuscation effectiveness 
experiment provided analytical proof that an obfuscation process must obfuscate all 
layers of a packet in order to be effective as SNOS did.   
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Appendix A: SNOS Protocol Obfuscation List 
Protocol Obfuscation Additional Information 
HTTP Request UserAgent field  
HTTP Response Server field  
HTTP Response X-Powered-By field  
HTTP Response MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices field  
HTTP Response MS-Authored-By field  
HTTP Response DAV field  
HTTP Response DASL field  
HTTP Response Public field  
HTTP Response Modify HTML content (Response codes: 400 & 401)  
IP TTL field  
IP IPID field  
IP DF bit changed to 0  
IP EnablePMTUDiscovery  Registry modification 
IP Recalculate IP checksum  
ICMP Request Block Incoming ICMP Timestamp requests  
ICMP Reply Increase payload size  
ICMP Reply Modify payload data   
ICMP Reply Recalculate ICMP checksum  
SMB Response NativeOS field  
SMB Response Natvie Lan Manager field  
SMB Response Native Primary Domain field  
SMB Response Flags  
SMB Response Flags2 for AndX response  
SMB Request Obfuscate Dialect Index Field  
SMB Request Block incoming Null session requests  
SMB Request Block data available to Null sessions Registry modification 
TCP Acknowledgement # field (w/out a corresponding SYN packet)  
TCP Window Size Registry modification 
TCP Options Registry modification 
TCP TcpUseRFC1122UrgentPointer Registry modification 
TCP SackOpts Registry modification 
TCP Recalculate TCP checksum  
Ethernet MTU Registry modification 
TCP Removed Option NOP, sack permitted   
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SMTP Response Email server banner (status 200)  
Browser Protocol OS Major  
Browser Protocol OS Minor  
UDP Recalculate UDP checksum  
DHCP Modified Option 60 value (MSFT 5.0)  
DHCP Modified Option 55 values  
DHCP  Modified Bootp_flags  
SSH Request Drop incoming packets from Protocol: SSHx-x-Nmap  
SSH Response Modifiy SSH protocol to SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_3.8.1p1  
DNS Response Obfuscate flag options  
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Appendix B:  Obfuscation Effectiveness Results 
 
143 
 
 
 
144 
 
 
 
145 
 
 
 
146 
 
 
 
147 
 
 
 
148 
 
 
 
149 
 
 
 
150 
 
 
 
  
151 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Appendix C:  Network Latency Results 
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Appendix D:  Nmap Operating System Identification 
  
No Obfuscation OSfuscate SNOS 
 
Run OS Services Combined OS Services Combined OS Services Combined 
Exchange 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
SharePoint 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Web 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Workstation 1 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
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8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
14 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
28 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
31 Y N Y Y N Y N N N 
 
32 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
37 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y N Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Total 160 
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Appendix E:  Nmap Operating System Identification Histograms 
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Appendix F:  Nessus Operating System Identification 
  
No Obfuscation OSfuscate SNOS 
 
Run OS Services Combined OS Services Combined OS Services Combined 
Exchange 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
SharePoint 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Web 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Workstation 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
26 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
 
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
Total 160 
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Appendix G:  Nessus Operating System Identification Histograms 
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